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I. INTRODUCTION
A central difference between contract and property concerns the
freedom to "customize" legally enforceable interests. The law of contract
recognizes no inherent limitations on the nature or the duration of the
interests that can be the subject of a legally binding contract. Certain types
of promises-such as promises to commit a crime-are declared
unenforceable as a matter of public policy. But outside these relatively
narrow areas of proscription and requirements such as definiteness and
(maybe) consideration, there is a potentially infinite range of promises that
the law will honor. The parties to a contract are free to be as whimsical or
fanciful as they like in describing the promise to be performed, the
consideration to be given in return for the promise, and the duration of the
agreement.
The law of property is very different in this respect. Generally
speaking, the law will enforce as property only those interests that conform
to a limited number of standard forms. As it is stated in a leading English
case, "incidents of a novel kind" cannot "be devised and attached to
property at the fancy or caprice of any owner."' With respect to interests in
land, for example, the basic forms are the fee simple, the defeasible fee
simple, the life estate, and the lease. When parties wish to transfer property
in land, they must specify which legal form they are using-fee simple,
lease, and so forth. If they fail to be clear about which legal interest they are
conveying, or if they attempt to customize a new type of interest, the courts
will generally recast the conveyance as creating one of the recognized
forms. Of course, the law freely allows customization of the more physical,
tangible dimensions of ownership rights. Property comes in all sorts of
shapes and sizes. But with respect to the legal dimensions of property, the
law generally insists on strict standardization.
Every common-law lawyer is schooled in the understanding that
property rights exist in a fixed number of forms. The principle is
acknowledged-at least by implication-in the "catalogue of estates" or
"forms of ownership" familiar to anyone who has survived a first-year
property course in an American law school.2 The principle, however, is by
1. Keppell v. Bailey, 39 Eng. Rep. 1042, 1049 (Ch. 1834).
2. Standard reference and instructional materials present the list of property options as being
closed. For example, a chapter entitled "Introduction to Permissible Interests in Land" in a
leading treatise begins as follows: "This Treatise explores and discusses the general principles of
law that apply to 'permissible interests in land,' which courts and legislatures have recognized."
1 RicHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 11.01, at 11-2 (Patrick J. Rohan ed.,
1999); see also CHARLES DONAHUE, JR_ ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION 457 (3d ed. 1993) (" IT]he common law
regarded the system of estates as closed."); JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY
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no means limited to estates in land and future interests; it is also reflected in
other areas of property law, including landlord-tenant, easements and
servitudes, and intellectual property. Nor is the principle confined to
common-law countries; to the contrary, it appears to be a universal feature
of all modem property systems.' In the common law, the principle that
property rights must conform to certain standardized forms has no name. In
the civil law, which recognizes the doctrine explicitly, it is called the
numerus clausus-the number is closed.4 We adopt this term for purposes
of our discussion here, which focuses primarily on the common law.
As befits a doctrine that has no name, the principle that property rights
must track a limited number of standard forms has received very little
examination in Anglo-American legal literature. We have discovered only
one full-length English-language article on the numerus clausus.5 This
is again in contrast to the civil law, where the doctrine is widely
acknowledged by commentators as being a substantive limitation on the
definition of property, as in Germany,' or a limitation on the circumstances
204 (4th ed. 1998) (referring to the "standardization of estates"); LEWIS M. SIMES & ALLAN F.
SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 61, at 45-46 (2d ed. 1956) (presenting a short section
entitled "A Doctrine of Fixed Types of Estates").
3. As one leading English comparativist has stated, "In all 'non-feudal' systems with which I
am familiar (whether earlier, as at Rome, or later), the pattern is (in very general terms) similar:
there are less than a dozen sorts of property entitlement." Bernard Rudden, Economic Theory v.
Property Law: The Numerus Clausus Problem, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE: THIRD
SERIES 239, 241 (John Eekelaar & John Bell eds., 1987). As noted infra Section fI.B, depending
on how one does the classification, American common law recognizes more than a dozen forms of
property. Still, as far as we are aware, Rudden's point about the number of forms being finite and
effectively closed in all known non-feudal property systems is accurate.
4. John Henry Merryman, Policy, Autonomy, and the Numerus Clausus in Italian and
American Property Law, 12 AM. J. COMP. L. 224 (1963); Rudden, supra note 3, at 240.
5. Rudden, supra note 3. Certain applications of the doctrine are addressed in Merryman,
supra note 4, and, as we note below, the doctrine is considered in passing in a variety of sources.
6. The term numerus clausus is used in Germany alongside Typenzwang and Typenfixierung
(both meaning "fixation of types" of property); the principle is considered a substantive limitation
on the definition of property implicit in the code. See § 854 BGB (defining property); PHILIPP
HECK, GRUNDRIB DES SACHENRECHTS §§ 23, 120(6) (1930). According to one treatise, for
example, interested parties
cannot be free to endow any right that they please pertaining to a thing with the
character of a real right. The principle of freedom of contract, which dominates the law
of obligations, has no validity in the law of property. Here the contrary principle holds:
The interested parties can only establish such rights as are permitted by the law. The
number of real rights is therefore necessarily a closed one.
3 MOTIVE ZU DEM ENTWURFE EINES BJRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES FUR DAS DEUTSCHE REICH
3 (Berlin & Leipzig, Guttentag 1888) (authors' translation); OTO PALANDT, BORGERLICHES
GESETZBUCH 1069 (Peter Bassenge et al. eds., 59th ed. 2000); see also, e.g., KARL-HERMANN
CAPELLE, BORGERLICHES RECHT: SACHENRECHT 13 (1963) ("Numerus Clausus, Typenzwang
oder Typenfixierung"); KLAUS SCHREmER, SACHENRECHT 28-29 (1993) ("Typenzwang und
Typenfixierung"); JAN WILHELM, SACHENRECHT 146 (1993) ("Numerus Clausus /
Typenzwang"); Jiirgen Kohler, The Law of Rights in Rem, in INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW
227, 230 (Werner F. Ebke & Matthew W. Finkin eds., 1996) ("numerus clausus of rights in
rem").
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in which property rights can be enforced against third parties, as in Japan7
and perhaps France,8 or at least an unstated design principle.9
Particularly striking is the virtual absence of any treatment of the
numerus clausus by scholars influenced by the law-and-economics
movement. The principle that property forms are fixed and limited in
number represents an extremely important qualification to the principle of
freedom of contact-a principle widely regarded by law-and-economics
scholars as promoting the efficient allocation of resources. A willing buyer
and a willing seller can create an infinite variety of enforceable contracts
for the exchange of recognized property rights, and can describe these
property rights along a multitude of physical dimensions and prices. But
common-law courts will not enforce an agreement to create a new type of
property right. Remarkably, virtually no effort has been made to theorize
7. The numerus clausus principle is well-established in Japanese law, although in contrast to
German law, Japanese law regards the principle, which is reflected in Civil Code Article 175,
more as a limitation on the circumstances in which property rights can be enforced against third
parties. MINP0, art. 175; see, e.g., YOSIYUKI NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW 198-99
(Anthony H. Angelo ed. & trans., 1976) (noting that Civil Code Article 175 limits property rights
to types created by legislation and that registration is not required to create a property right but is
required for enforcement of the right against third parties); HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 157
(1992) (discussing Article 175 limitations) id. at 158-61 (noting that registration is not required to
create a property right but is required for enforcement of the right against third parties); see also,
e.g., I J.E. DE BECKER, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF THE CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN 140-42
(1921) (noting that it is the policy of Article 175 to limit types of property rights); J. MARK
RAMSEYER & MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 25-26 (1999)
(noting in passing that Article 175 limits estates in land).
8. The numerus clausus is recognized as a principle of French law, and controversy centers
on whether it is a substantive limitation implied by Code civil Article 543 or is created through the
rather strict formalities required for enforcement of property rights. See generally CHRISTIAN
ATIAS, DROIT CIVIL: LES BIENS § 1, 39, at 44-45 (3d ed. 1993) (reviewing the history of
limitations on types of property rights in French law). Compare EMILE CHINON, LES
D12MEMBREMENTS DE LA PROPRIEI FONCItRE EN FRANCE AVANT ET APRtS LA REVOLUTION
§ 60, at 180-83 (2d ed. 1923) (arguing for the limiting character of Article 543), and S.
GINOSSAR, DROIT RFEL, PROPRIITt ET CRIANCE: ELABORATION D'UN SYSTtME RATIONNEL DES
DRorrs PATRIMONIAUX 146-51 (1960) (arguing that the numerus clausus is implied by Article
543), with 3 MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGES RIPERT, TRAITI PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL
FRANCAIS: MAURICE PICARD, LES BIENS § 3, 48, at 52-54 (1st ed. 1926) (arguing that the civil
law does not formally prohibit creation of new forms of property but renders such creation
extremely rare through limits on in rein enforcement, antifragmentation devices, and requirements
of publicity).
9. For example, in Roman law the servitude (servilus) was defined as a modification of full
ownership, and included usufructs (usus fructus). Servitudes were subject to limitations and a
presumption against creating new types. FRITZ SCHULZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW 336-37, 381-
88, 393-94 (1951); FRITZ SCHULZ, PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW 153-55 (1936); ALAN WATSON,
THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC 180 (1968) (" [E]ven in classical law a
right, to be accepted as a servitude, had to fall within a recognized type."); see also A.M.
PRICHARD, LEAGE'S ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 157-60, 208-09 (3d ed. 1961) (noting limitations on
types of property rights and stating that other rights were contractual). The later breakdown of the
classical system included a loosening of the limitations on servitudes. ERNST LEVY, WEST
ROMAN VULGAR LAW: THE LAW OF PROPERTY 55-59 (1951).
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about whether this critical qualification to freedom of contract is justifiable
in economic terms.1°
The primary candidate for an economic explanation has been the
suggestion that the numerus clausus is a device for minimizing the effects
of durable property interests on those dealing with assets in the future, 1 and
in particular the effects of excessive fragmentation of interests, or an
"anticommons." 2 On this view, the numerus clausus serves to prevent
situations in which too many individuals have a veto right over the use or
disposition of a resource. But whatever the merits of this anti-fragmentarian
view for other property doctrines, it does not fully explain the numerus
clausus, which is aimed at limiting types of rights, not the number of
rightholders. As we show below, limiting fragmentation is at best an
incidental effect of the numerus clausus, and does not appear to be a
sufficiently robust explanation to account for the universal nature of the
doctrine and its tenacious hold on postfeudal legal systems. 3
When one turns to the snippets of commentary on the numerus clausus
found in more conventional Anglo-American legal literature, one finds that
the attitude is often one of hostility. Scholars and judges tend to react to
manifestations of the numerus clausus as if it were nothing more than
outmoded formalism. For example, the idea that property may exist only in
prescribed forms is implicitly debunked by quoting Holmes's aphorism that
"it is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV." 14 Taking this position one step further,
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) scholars have portrayed the doctrine of fixed
estates as perniciously reinforcing hierarchical social relations. As one
CLS-inspired source puts it, the "formalistic, box-like structure" of
10. A partial exception is Rudden, supra note 3, which touches upon several possible
economic justifications for the doctrine, including the third-party information-cost theory we
develop at length in Part Il of this Article. Id. at 254-56. Rudden ultimately concludes, however,
that the rationale for the doctrine remains a mystery. Id. at 261.
11. This argument is made in its most general form in Carol M. Rose, What Government Can
Do for Property (and Vice Versa), in THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
GOVERNMENT AND PROPERTY 209, 214-15 (Nicholas Mercuro & Warren J. Samuels eds., 1999).
This concern about future parties dealing in assets subject to idiosyncratic or fragmented rights
also animates the vaguer concerns in traditional doctrine about restraints on alienation and the
more recent literature reflecting anti-fragmentarian concerns. See infra Section IV.B.
12. Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1176-78
(1999).
13. Infra Section IV.B.
14. E.g., CURTIS J. BERGER & JOAN C. WILLIAMS, PROPERTY: LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE
213-14 (4th ed. 1997) (reproducing a case quoting the aphorism in discussing the doctrine of fixed
estates); DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 2, at 459 (quoting the aphorism in notes discussing the
doctrine). The aphorism originally appeared in Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law,
10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). English commentators evince similar attitudes. E.g., Susan
Bright, Of Estates and Interests: A Tale of Ownership and Property Rights, in LAND LAW:
THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES 529, 546 (Susan Bright & John Dewar eds., 1998) (stating that
English judges have "bolt[ed] the door" on existing categories of property and "[ilt is about time
that the door was opened and new rights admitted on a more principled basis").
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property law, that is, the numerus clausus, reflects a "feudal vision of
property relationships designed to channel (force?) people into pre-set
social relationships." 15
A related source of antipathy to the numerus clausus may be the
perception that it is a trap for the unwary. The menu of recognized property
forms is relatively complex, and any attempt to venture beyond simple sales
of goods and short-term leases into the arcane worlds of future interests,
easements and covenants, or intellectual property requires the advice of a
lawyer. When unsophisticated or poorly advised actors enter these worlds,
they may find that courts force the transaction into one of the established
"boxes," with the result that the actors' intentions are frustrated. By
contrast, actors who are sophisticated or well-advised can almost always
manipulate the menu of options so as to realize their objectives. 6 In this
sense, the numerus clausus discriminates in favor of those who are well-
endowed with legal resources and against those who are poorly endowed. 7
A third source of the antagonism toward the numerus clausus may be
the lessons supposedly learned from the reform movement in landlord-
tenant law. This reform effort has often proceeded under the banner of
discarding outmoded "property" concepts in favor of the greater flexibility
and attention to the parties' intentions associated with "contract"
precepts. 8 By extension, other features of property law that deviate from
the norms of free contract may fall under a cloud of suspicion. Here again,
standardization of forms is associated with the ancien rigime, and
contractual norms are assumed to be more open, fair, and egalitarian.
15. BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 211. The junior editor of this casebook, Joan
Williams, has been influenced by CLS theory. See generally, e.g., Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of
Property, 83 IOWA L. REv. 277 (1998).
Whatever the merits of such critiques of formalism in other contexts, they are ironic when
directed against the numerus clausus. Historically, the doctrine is closely associated with efforts in
post-revolutionary France to eliminate the proliferation of fragmented rights characteristic of
feudal regimes. CHINON, supra note 8, at 91-183; Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions
of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 434, 442 (1998);
see also John Henry Merryman, Ownership and Estate, 48 TUL. L. REv. 916, 938-43 (1974). In
other words, the doctrine was originally embraced (at least by the French) because it would
undermine established hierarchies, not because it would reinforce them.
16. E.g., Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformulating the Structure of Estates: A Proposal for
Legislative Action, 85 HARV. L. REv. 729, 732 (1972).
17. Cf Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1685, 1699-1700 (1976) (noting the argument that formalism in law tends to favor those
with greater access to legal resources).
18. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074-77 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 207-08 (Vt. 1984). The notion that these judicial reforms reflect
a contractual model of leases is dubious, since the reforms are often based on the terms of housing
codes and other statutes and are typically nonwaivable. Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation
of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C. L. REv. 503, 504-05 (1982). See generally Roger A.
Cunningham, The New Implied and Statutory Warranties of Habitability in Residential Leases:
From Contract to Status, 16 URB. L. ANN. 3 (1979).
2000]
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These casual criticisms of the numerus clausus fail to confront what to
us are the essential questions. Before condemning standardization of forms
and embracing a regime of contractual freedom with respect to the legal
dimensions of property, one must first engage in a series of inquiries: What
are the costs and benefits of standardization in defining property rights? To
what extent should standardization of rights be supplied by the government
rather than relying solely on owners' incentives to conform to the most-
widely used forms? If the government plays a role in standardizing rights,
what is the appropriate division of labor between courts and legislatures in
enforcing standardization and in making the inevitable changes to the menu
of standard forms that must occur over time?
In Part II of the Article, we survey the common law of property in an
effort to ascertain the extent to which the numerus clausus is a recognized
feature of that law. We find that, in practice, courts and lawyers routinely
abide by the principle, even if they are unaware of its existence. Perhaps
because it is so little discussed or recognized, however, modern American
courts sometimes waver when faced with a direct challenge to the numerus
clausus, and flirt with the notion that property forms should be subject to
modification by contract.
In Part III, we set forth a positive theory of the numerus clausus, and in
particular, why property rights, unlike contract rights, are restricted to a
limited number of standardized forms. The root of the difference, we
suggest, stems from the in rem nature of property rights: When property
rights are created, third parties must expend time and resources to
determine the attributes of these rights, both to avoid violating them and to
acquire them from present holders. The existence of unusual property rights
increases the cost of processing information about all property rights. Those
creating or transferring idiosyncratic property rights cannot always be
expected to take these increases in measurement costs fully into account,
making them a true externality. Standardization of property rights reduces
these measurement costs.
Although the numerus clausus represents a use of law to restrict
individual choice, in actual operation it is not inconsistent with private
ordering and freedom of contract. Like another network, language, the
system of property rights contains features that allow the creation of very
complex composite rights out of a limited vocabulary and rules of
combination. As in the case of human language, because so much can be
done functionally with simple building blocks, the generative power of the
system cannot be measured by counting the number of basic building
blocks allowed. Accordingly, the amount of frustration caused by
standardizing the building blocks is far less than would be the case if a
specially tailored basic building block were required for every purpose to
which property rights can be put.
[Vol. 110: 1
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Part IV considers and rejects several potential objections to our
.explanation. These include the claim that measurement costs can be
reduced just as effectively by mandating notice of idiosyncratic property
forms as by standardization; that parties have adequate incentives to seek to
conform to the most-commonly used forms without legal compulsion
because of network effects; that standardization can be supplied by private
institutions rather than by law; that the numerus clausus is a response to a
concern with fragmentation rather than a device for lowering information
costs; and that the numerus clausus has been rendered irrelevant by
developments in contract law.
In Part V, we consider how the numerus clausus functions as an
instrument of institutional choice. If the number of property forms is
"closed," and cannot be expanded either by the parties' contract or through
judicial interpretation, then reforms to the system of property rights
generally must occur through legislation rather than through judicial
entrepreneurship. We argue that, because of several critical attributes of
legislative rulemaking, this feature also functions on balance to reduce the
costs to third parties of measuring the legal dimensions of property rights.
Thus, the institutional-choice implications of the doctrine reinforce the
basic information-cost rationale we identify.
H. THE NUMERUS CLA USUS IN THE COMMON LAW OF PROPERTY
To what extent does the common law of property reflect the numerus
clausus principle? The question does not admit of an easy answer because
of an odd disconnect in the law. On the one hand, courts and commentators
behave as if we have a property system characterized by a limited number
of forms not subject to contractual or judicial modification. On the other
hand, there is no explicit recognition of the numerus clausus, which
naturally renders the status of the doctrine somewhat insecure. Indeed, we
find some evidence of an incipient attitude that courts should simply
enforce the intentions of the parties and abandon any insistence that
property rights conform to a finite list of recognized forms.
A. The Numerus Clausus as a Norm of Judicial Self-Governance
Given basic differences between civil-law systems and common-law
systems, it is perhaps not surprising that the numerus clausus is expressly
recognized in the former but not the latter. Civil-law jurisprudence rests on
the premise that the code is the exclusive source of legal obligation. Thus,
19. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 749 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
2000]
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if the code recognizes certain forms of property, but not others, it follows
logically that the forms enumerated in the code are the only types of
property that the judiciary may enforce.2' The parties may not create a new
type of property by contract, nor may the judiciary on its own authority
invent new property rights, because this would contradict the code's status
as the exclusive source of legal obligation. Thus, the only way to subtract
from or add to the list of legally sanctioned property forms is for the
legislature to amend the code.
The common law, of course, rejects the assumption that enacted law is
the exclusive source of legal obligation. Especially in private law-
contracts, torts, and property-common-law courts are regarded as having
inherent power to define basic legal principles and obligations. The
Blackstonian justification for this judicial authority is that common-law
courts enforce principles grounded in immemorial custom.2 The modem
justification is that common-law courts exercise inherent policymaking
authority with respect to private law, subject to legislative revision.22
Whatever the justification, the common law's rejection of the exclusivity
postulate of the civil law means that the numerus clausus cannot be derived
deductively from fundamental postulates about the legal system. In
common-law systems, there is no inherent reason why all existing forms of
property should derive from an act of the legislature, nor is there any
inherent reason why existing forms of property should not be subject to
judicial revision and supplementation.
Yet notwithstanding the absence of logical compulsion behind the
numerus clausus in common-law systems, it is reasonably clear that
common-law courts behave toward property rights very much like civil-law
1994) (stating that civil-law codes are based on "a self-contained body of statutory provisions
which are to be taken as the exclusive source of law, and to which all judicial decisions must be
referred"); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 22-23 (2d ed. 1985) (stating that the
separation of powers as formulated in civil-law countries precludes the doctrine of stare decisis
and judge-made law and that in the civil-law tradition "only statutes enacted by the legislative
power could be law," supplemented by administrative regulations and custom); ALAN WATSON,
THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL LAW 168 (1981) (arguing that statutes, including foremost the code,
along with governmental and ministerial decrees, are the only independent source of law, with a
possible subordinate source of law in custom).
20. In civil-law systems, the numerus clausus is often said to be an independent substantive
doctrine or a principle implicit in the civil code. Supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text. In at
least one civil-law country, the numerus clausus is directly incorporated in the code. Rudden,
supra note 3, at 243 (discussing the civil code of Argentina).
21. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69 ("[A judge is] sworn to determine, not
according to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of the land;
not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one."); Albert W.
Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 37, 43 (1996) (noting that the
declaratory theory reflects a strong presumption against judicial innovation, and that Blackstone
"may have viewed legislatures rather than courts as the principal source of legal innovation").
22. See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 1-7 (1988);
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 9-23 (1990).
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courts do: They treat previously-recognized forms of property as a closed
list that can be modified only by the legislature. This behavior cannot be
attributed to any explicit or implicit command of the legislature. It is best
described as a norm of judicial self-governance. Jurisprudentially speaking,
the numerus clausus functions in the common law much like a canon of
interpretation, albeit a canon that applies to common-law decisionmaking
rather than statutory or constitutional interpretation,23 or like a strong
default rule in the interpretation of property rights.24
Before reviewing the evidence in support of our contention that
common-law courts follow the numerus clausus as a norm of self-
governance, it is useful to consider an example of the principle in operation.
Landlord-tenant law includes a version of the numerus clausus principle.
Leases are limited to four recognized types: the term of years, the periodic
tenancy, the tenancy at will, and the tenancy at sufferance.' 5 Suppose a
landlord and tenant decide to enter into a lease that does not conform to any
of the four standard types-a tenancy "for the duration of the war" being
the classic example.26 If landlord-tenant law were just like the law of
contract, then there would be no reason not to enforce this agreement in
accordance with its terms; that is, the tenancy would last until the war ends.
But courts typically do not proceed this way. Instead, they seek to
determine which of the four recognized types of leases best fits what the
parties have created. Since a term of years requires a "definite calendar
ending," 27 and wars last for an uncertain length of time, most courts have
concluded that a tenancy "for the duration of the war" must be either a
periodic tenancy (if the lease provides for payment of rent at periodic
intervals) or a tenancy at will.28 The result of the pigeon-holing exercise in
23. On the importance of substantive canons in the interpretation of enacted law, see, for
example, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 275-306 (1994);
and CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY
STATE 147-57 (1990).
24. Default rules in contract law range in strength according to how explicit one must be to
contract around the default. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rides, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 119-25 (1989).
25. E.g., 2 POWELL, supra note 2, §§ 16.03-.06, at 16-55 to 16-103; ROBERT S.
SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT §§ 2:1-:26, at 30-83 (1980);
4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 39.02(c), at 492 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994).
26. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.14, at 209-10 (A. James Casner ed., 1952);
2 POWELL, supra note 2, § 16.03[4][b], at 16-68 to 16-69.
27. 2 POWELL, supra note 2, § 16.03[4][b], at 16-68.
28. Nat'l Bellas Hess v. Kalis, 191 F.2d 739 (8th Cir. 1951); Stanmeyer v. Davis, 53 N.E.2d
22 (111. App. Ct. 1944); Lace v. Chandler, 1 All E.R. 305 (K.B. 1944). But cf Smith's Transfer &
Storage Co. v. Hawkins, 50 A.2d 267, 268 (D.C. 1946) (concluding that a term of years requires
only that the lease be certain to end, not that it have a definite calendar ending, and thus that a
tenancy until the termination of "the present war" was a term of years). American Law of
Property asserts that "the tendency has been to uphold such leases in accordance with the
intention of the parties." I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 26, § 3.14, at 209-10. But
the cases do not bear this out. The minority of courts that have upheld such leases as a term of
years have generally done so by changing the definition of a term of years, e.g., Smith's Transfer
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this example is thus that the parties' intentions are frustrated, because
neither a periodic tenancy nor a tenancy at will has the same security of
tenure as a tenancy for the duration of the war presumably would have if
enforced according to its terms."
B. The Common Law's Standardization of Property
The following is a brief summary of the menu of property forms that
exist today in American common law.3" Although we point out in passing
which forms are widely used and which ones are rarely encountered, we do
not attempt to provide a historical account of the rise and fall of the
different forms. The point of the discussion is to show that the number of
forms is fixed for most purposes, not to offer a substantive account of how
we came to have the particular menu of options that exist today. 1 We also
indicate, in each area, the general attitude of the courts toward claims for
the recognition of novel forms of property.
1. Estates in Land
The common-law system of estates in land is an area of property law
universally recognized to have a "formalistic, box-like structure."32 There
& Storage Co., 50 A.2d 267, not by declaring that the parties are free to modify the available
forms of leases by contract.
29. As usual, the clever conveyancer can get around the problem, here most likely by creating
a term of years determinable. Thus, for example, one could create a lease "for fifty years unless
the war ends sooner." This is not exactly identical to a lease "for the duration of the war," but in
most wars it would achieve the same result. 2 POWELL, supra note 2, § 16.03[4][b], at 16-68.
Commentators have predictably seized on the ability to get around the common-law rule by clever
conveyancing as evidence that the numerus clausus principle represents a "triumph of form over
substance." Id.; see also 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 26, § 3.14, at 210. But this
is true only if the measurement costs to third parties of ascertaining the meaning of a lease "for
fifty years unless the war ends sooner" are the same as the costs of ascertaining the meaning of a
lease "for the duration of the war." As to this question, see infra text accompanying note 133.
30. For overviews, see, for example, THOMAS F. BERGIN & PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO
ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 19-80 (2d ed. 1984); JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W.
JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 40-140 (3d ed. 1989); and ROGER A.
CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 26-504 (2d ed. 1993).
31. If such an account were to be developed, it would show that legislation has played a
larger role in the creation of the forms of property than most common-law lawyers might suppose.
For example, the statute Quia Emptores, 1290, 18 Edw. (Eng.), which made free tenements
alienable, played a critical role in the development of the fee simple, and the fee tail was created
by the statute De Donis Conditionalibus, 1285, 13 Edw., ch. 1 (Eng.). Admittedly, however, a
number of forms have an uncertain provenance and probably reflect a large measure of customary
law. See, e.g., Richard Helmholz & Reinhard Zimmermann, Views of Trust and Treuhand: An
Introduction, in ITINERA FIDUCIAE: TRUST AND TREUHAND IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 27, 41-
42 (Richard Helmholz & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 1998) (noting the customary and Roman-
law background of trusts).
32. Cf. BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 211 (characterizing the common-law
approach to landlord and tenant law).
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are five general types of present possessory interests: the fee simple
absolute, the defeasible fee simple, the fee tail, the life estate, and the
lease.33 Some complications are always acknowledged: Defeasible fees and
leases can be further subdivided into subtypes,' 4 and the fee tail has been
abolished in nearly all jurisdictions and is for practical purposes defunct."
Each of these present possessory interests, except for the fee simple, has
one or more corresponding types of future interests: reversions, powers of
termination, remainders, and executory interests,36 again with subtypes.37
The exact number of estates in land varies somewhat, depending on how
the classifier treats the subtypes. But at bottom there is no disagreement
about the identity of the forms or their defining features.38 Moreover, for
purposes of everyday legal practice, the only forms that really matter are
the fee simple and the lease for a term of years.39 All other estates in land
are rarely encountered as legal interests.4°
In practice, courts enforce the numerus clausus principle strictly
(although not of course by name) in the context of estates in land. The
menu of forms is regarded as complete and not subject to additions.41 To
take one example, testators have occasionally left property to a surviving
spouse as a life estate, but with the power to convey or devise a fee
simple.42 The intention here appears to be to create a kind of hybrid
between a life estate and a fee simple-a life estate if the spouse dies
intestate but a fee simple if the spouse decides to sell or to make a gift of
33. 1 POWELL, supra note 2, § 12.01[2], at 12-5 (enumerating the categories of freehold
estates and the subcategories of leases).
34. The defeasible fee is usually subdivided into the fee simple determinable, the fee simple
subject to condition subsequent, and the fee simple subject to an executory limitation.
CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 30, at 35-36; 1 POWELL, supra note 2, § 12.01[2], at 12-5 &
n. 13. Leases are usually subdivided into the term of years, the periodic lease, the tenancy at will,
and the tenancy at sufferance. E.g., 2 POWELL, supra note 2, §§ 16.03-.06, at 16-55 to 16-103.
35. 2 POWELL, supra note 2, 196, at 14-16 to 14-18. Even before the legislative movement
for repeal, the fee tail was not widely used in the United States. Gregory S. Alexander, Time and
Property in the American Republican Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 295 (1991).
36. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 30, at 86.
37. Remainders can be classified as indefeasibly vested, contingent, vested subject to open,
and vested subject to complete defeasance. Id. at 97. Executory interests can he classified as
shifting or springing. Id. at 107-12.
38. Powers of appointment are sometimes added to the list of future interests. E.g.,
3 POWELL, supra note 2, § 20.01 [2], at 20-6. But the Restatement and most commentators classify
powers of appointment as representing a special type of power to complete "the terms of a
disposition made by a transferor." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 11.1 cmt. f (1986).
39. Cf. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 30, at 28 (explaining that the fee simple absolute
and the estate for years are the only estates that are commercially salable).
40. Life estates are encountered, but nearly always today as equitable interests conveyed in
trust. Id.
41. Indeed, the usual complaint is that there are too many recognized types of future interests,
and that legislation should be adopted simplifying the existing menu of options. See, e.g.,
Waggoner, supra note 16, at 752-56.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. b (1984);
1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 26, § 2.15, at 126-27.
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the property by will. No court, however, has recognized such a hybrid
estate. Courts are divided as to the proper characterization of such an
interest: Some construe it to create a life estate,43 others to create a fee
simple.' But all courts recognize that the task is to squeeze the interest into
one of the established categories, the only question being which
standardized box is most consistent with the testator's intentions or is
otherwise "best" in terms of policy concerns such as promoting the free
alienability of property .
Although the menu of available estates in land is fixed from the
perspective of the parties and the courts, this does not mean that property in
land is standardized along all dimensions. The law of course permits an
immense amount of customization in the physical attributes of rights in
land, including the shape and size of the parcel and the types of
improvements on the land. And it is possible to cut short present possessory
interests or create future interests upon the occurrence of specified
conditions (such as a condition that a child reach the age of twenty-one or
that a surviving spouse remain unmarried), and these conditions are not
themselves limited.46 Still, with respect to the most basic legal dimensions,
such as duration, powers of alienation, rights of inheritance, and so forth,
the system of estates in land presents the picture of highly standardized
building blocks not subject to modification by contract or judicial decree.
2. Concurrent Interests
The system of estates in land distinguishes forms of property based on
their temporal dimension. Cutting across the temporal or "horizontal"
dimension is what might be called the "vertical" dimension-the different
43. E.g., Smith v. Bell, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 68 (1832); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Morton,
468 S.W.2d 193, 198 (Mo. 1971).
44. E.g., Sumner v. Borders, 98 S.W.2d 918, 919-20 (Ky. 1936); Fox v. Snow, 76 A.2d 877,
877-78 (N.J. 1950) (per curiam). A third possibility, said to have been suggested by Holmes, is
that the gift over in such cases would be classified as a springing executory interest subject to a
power of appointment by the original grantee. HART & SACKS, supra note 19, at 590-91. This
ingenious solution probably more closely tracks the grantor's intentions than does either the fee
simple or life estate construction. Note, however, that Holmes also described this solution in terms
of recognized interests-executory interests and powers of appointment. He did not suggest that
the hybrid interest simply be enforced in accordance with the grantor's intentions.
45. See, e.g., Bell, 31 U.S. at 74-79 (construing the interest to be a life estate because this is
most consistent with the intentions of the grantor); Sumner, 98 S.W.2d at 919 (construing the
interest to be a fee simple based on a constructional principle favoring fee simples in cases of
doubt).
46. 1 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 23 cmt. d (1936) (noting a variety of conditions
that can be imposed as special limitations on a fee simple or life estate); id. § 24 cmt. c (noting a
variety of conditions that can be imposed as conditions subsequent on a fee simple or a term of
years); id. § 25 cmt. f (noting a variety of conditions that can be imposed as triggers of executory
interests); 2 id. § 157 cmt. r (providing illustrations of conditions that can be imposed as triggers
of vested remainders subject to complete defeasance); id. § 157 cmt. u (providing illustrations of
conditions that can be imposed as triggers of contingent remainders).
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forms of concurrent interests in property among multiple parties.47
American law recognizes five basic categories of concurrent interests:48
tenancy in common; joint tenancy; marital property;49 trusts; and
condominiums, cooperatives, and time-shares.
The numerus clausus principle is also quite strong in the concurrent-
interest area. There have been a number of modifications in the forms of
concurrent property in the last century. But these changes have almost
always been the product of legislative reforms, not judicial rulings, and thus
are consistent with a rule of judicial self-governance treating existing forms
as closed. Changing conceptions of women's rights have given rise to a
number of reforms of marital property interests. For example, common-law
rights of dower and curtesy have been abolished in almost all
jurisdictions.5" Tenancies by the entirety, another form of concurrent
property right limited to married couples, have also been abolished in many
states.5 Usually this has been done expressly by statute, although in rare
instances, courts have construed legislative silence as requiring abolition.5"
The tenancy in partnership-another common-law form of concurrent
ownership-has also been displaced in all states by the adoption of the
Uniform Partnership Act.53
In terms of creation of new concurrent interests, the most dramatic
development has been the emergence of condominiums and time-shares.
These interests reflect a combination of features of other types of property
interests. Individuals hold what amounts to a fee simple in separate units of
a complex or in a separate unit for a defined period of time and concurrent
interests in common areas along with other association members; relations
among concurrent owners are controlled by rules and regulations enforced
by a governing body.' In theory, it might be possible to create a
47. As a rule, the forms of property based on duration (e.g., the fee simple or the lease) can be
combined with the forms based on multiple ownership (e.g., tenancy in common). DUKEMINIER &
KRIER, supra note 2, at 321 n.l. Thus, one can hold a lease as a tenant in common or a possibility
of reverter as community property.
48. 5 POWELL, supra note 2, § 40.500, at 40-3 (trust); 7 id. § 49.01, at 49-2 (nontrust
concurrent interests).
49. Marital property has a number of subdivisions, including dower, curtesy, common-law
marital property, tenancies by the entirety, and community property. See 3 THOMPSON ON REAL
PROPERTY, supra note 25, § 21.01-.02, at 2-157 (curtesy and dower); 4 id. § 37.01, at 267-68
(common law and community property); id. § 37.06(a), at 290-96 (common-law marital property
including tenancy by the entirety).
50. 2 POWELL, supra note 2, § 213, at 15-121 to 15-127; see also infra notes 228-229 and
accompanying text.
51. 7 POWELL, supra note 2, § 620[4], at 52-3 to 52-12.
52. E.g., Hannon v. S. Pac. R.R., 107 P. 335, 339 (Cal. 1909); In re Richardson's Estate, 282
N.W. 585, 587 (Wis. 1938).
53. 7 POWELL, supra note 2. § 608, at 50-62. Under the Uniform Act, "individual partners
own the partnership property in theory, but all the incidents of ownership are vested in the
partnership." MELVIN A. EISENBERG, AN INTRODUCTION TO AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 64
(1987).
54. CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 126.
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condominium by clever combination of preexisting property forms.5 But in
practice, condominiums did not emerge until the 1960s, when virtually all
states adopted statutes expressly authorizing the creation of
condominiums.56 Thus, the story of the emergence of the condominium is
also broadly consistent with the numerus clausus in that this new form of
property was the product of legislative change, rather than private contract
or judicial innovation.
3. Nonpossessory Interests
Another general category of property rights in land consists of interests
that confer only limited rights of use as opposed to general possession.
Here, American law recognizes four basic forms: easements, real-
covenants, equitable servitudes, and profits.5 7 Easements and equitable
servitudes, the most commonly encountered forms, are devices for
permitting multiple uses of a single parcel of land or controlling
externalities associated with particular land uses.
The numerus clausus applies in a somewhat weakened form to
nonpossessory property rights. This area has witnessed one major judicial
innovation in the last 150 years: the emergence of the equitable servitude.
In English common law, negative easements were sharply limited in
number, and the burden of covenants respecting land could be enforced
against successors only in the landlord-tenant context." In response to
demand for a more flexible instrument that would allow the burden of
55. Id. at 126-29. Residential homeowners' associations-the key institutional mechanism
that makes the condominium possible-have been created using real covenants and equitable
servitudes. The seminal decision is Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Industrial
Savings Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1938).
56. Curtis J. Berger, Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation, 63 COLUM. L. REv.
987, 1001-03 (1963); Henry Hansmann, Condominium and Cooperative Housing: Transactional
Efficiency, Tax Subsidies, and Tenure Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 25, 61-63 (1991). The
triggering event for the enactment of these laws appears to have been a section of the National
Housing Act of 1961, which makes Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage insurance
available for condominiums, provided they have the sanction of state law. Hansmann, supra, at 62
n.83. The state statutes were based on an FHA model act, which closely followed a 1958 Puerto
Rican statute. ld.
57. A variety of subdivisions are possible. Easements have been subdivided into affirmative
and negative, 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 26, §§ 8.5, 8.11, 8.12, at 232, 236-37;
4 POWELL, supra note 2, § 34.02[2][c], at 34-16 to 34-17; 7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY,
supra note 25, § 60.02[e], and into appurtenant and in gross, 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,
supra note 26, §§ 8.6, 8.9, at 233-36; 4 POWELL, supra note 2, § 34.02[2][d], at 34-17 to 34-22;
7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 25, § 60.02(f). Real covenants and equitable
servitudes can likewise be subdivided into affirmative and negative. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, supra note 26, § 9.35, at 436-37; 9 POWELL, supra note 2, § 60.06[l], at 60-95
(affirmative and negative covenants); id. § 60.01[2), at 60-5 (affirmative and negative real
covenants); id. at 60-9 to 60-10 (affirmative and negative equitable servitudes).
58. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 26, § 9.1, at 335-38; 9 POWELL, supra
note 2, § 60.04[1], at 60-41.
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promises to run in planned residential developments, the English Court of
Chancery, in Tulk v. Moxhay,5 9 in effect created a new interest-the
equitable servitude. This was pure judicial entrepreneurship, as the court
was well aware, since it had to limit the holding in Keppell v. Bailey,60 the
leading English case holding that courts lack authority to transform contract
rights into new forms of property rights.
Notwithstanding this significant breach of the numerus clausus, we still
see significant evidence of the operation of the principle in this area. The
innovation wrought by the Court of Chancery was quickly limited, as
subsequent decisions held that equity would enforce promises as property
only if the promise benefits an appurtenant interest in land, only if the party
to be bound had notice of the promise, and only if the promise "touches and
concerns" the land.61 These limitations have also been accepted by
American courts, notwithstanding persistent criticism from the academic
community. 2
4. Interests in Personal Property
Personal property is restricted to fewer available forms of ownership
than real property. A number of standard reference works state that personal
property is subject to the same elaborate structure of forms that applies to
estates in land (including future interests).63 Yet the case law does not fully
support this broad proposition. It is reasonably well established that one can
59. 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
60. 39 Eng. Rep. 1042 (Ch. 1834).
61. ROBERT MEGARRY & H.W.R. WADE, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 772 (5th ed. 1984)
(citing decisions restricting enforcement of benefit to appurtenant land owners); id. at 779-80
(citing decisions holding that a purchaser without notice is not bound); id. at 781 (citing decisions
adopting the "touch and concern" requirement). For an account emphasizing the limitations on
equitable servitudes in English law, see D.J. Hayton, Restrictive Covenants as Property Interests,
87 LAW Q. REV. 539 (1971).
62. E.g., Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient
Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261 (1982); Uriel Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of
Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179 (1982).
63. E.g., CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 30, at 25. The Restatement (First) of Property
limits the definition of"estate" to "an interest in land," but adds that "[i]nterests which are quite
analogous" exist in personal property. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 9 cmt. a (1936).
According to Blackstone, the "antient common law" prohibited future interests in personal
property,
because, being things transitory, and by many accidents subject to be lost, destroyed, or
otherwise impaired, and the exigencies of trade requiring also a frequent circulation
thereof, it would occasion perpetual suits and quarrels, and put a stop to the freedom of
commerce, if such limitations in remainder were generally tolerated and allowed.
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *398. But Blackstone explained that the courts had
eventually relented, permitting bequests of personal goods and chattels for life, with a remainder
over to another. Id.
200]
The Yale Law Journal
create a life estate in personal property. 64 But there are few if any cases that
address the question of whether more exotic interests, such as defeasible
fees and executory interests, can be created in personal property. The reality
is that virtually anyone who wants to create complicated future interests in
personal property, including of course stocks, bonds, and shares in mutual
funds-the largest source of wealth in today's society-does so through a
trust.65 The trustee holds title to the personal property in fee simple, and the
beneficiaries hold life estates and remainders, or sometimes more unusual
interests, described using the building blocks of the common-law estates in
land. In effect, the trust combines a highly simplified title in the underlying
assets with a significant degree of flexibility in designating the beneficial
uses of those assets.
In other respects as well, the available forms of personal-property
ownership are more limited than with respect to real property. Statutes
authorizing the creation of condominiums and time-shares are limited to
real property.66 And although the case law is rather thin, it also appears that
one cannot create servitudes in personal property. This, at least, is the
position adopted by the English Court of Chancery in the nineteenth
century,67 and American precedent is largely, if not quite exclusively, in
accord.68 In any event, servitudes on personal property are rarely
64. See, e.g., Gruen v. Gruen, 496 N.E.2d 869 (N.Y. 1986); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
PROPERTY § 153(1) (1936); 4 WILLIAM J. BowE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF
WiELLS § 37.66 (1961); SIMES & SMITH, supra note 2, § 359, at 385-86.
65. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 236 (1922) ("Wealth,
in a commercial age, is made up largely of promises."); John H. Langbein, The Contractarian
Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 637-43 (1995) [hereinafter Langbein,
Contractarian Basis] (discussing how the trust has shifted from a conveyancing device for
freehold land to a management device for holding financial assets); John H. Langbein, The Secret
Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 165, 177-78
(1997) (documenting the importance of commercial trusts, which contain over 90% of the money
held in trusts). As far back as can be traced, the trust was always available for personal as well as
real property. Richard Helmholz, Trusts in the English Ecclesiastical Courts 1300-1640, in
ITINERA FIDUCIAE: TRUST AND TREUHAND IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 31, at 153,
160-62.
66. Infra note 110.
67. After some initial waffling, the English Court of Chancery held that equitable servitudes
could not be imposed on chattels, for example as vertical price restraints or vertical restrictions on
the use or resale of goods after the first sale. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on
Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REv. 945, 977-80 (1928).
68. In the United States, the question of whether it is possible to create servitudes on chattels
has been debated largely in terms of the antitrust laws. But in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), the leading antitrust case on vertical price restraints, the
U.S. Supreme Court appeared to endorse the same conclusion reached by the English courts as a
matter of property law. Id. at 404-05 (quoting John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 39
(6th Cir. 1907)). This appears to be the better view today: Equitable servitudes (and presumably
other nonpossessory property rights) apply only to real property. Cf. Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
The Music Goes Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1250
(1956) (commenting on Pratte v. Balatsos, 113 A.2d 492 (N.H. 1955), a decision departing from
the general understanding).
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encountered in practice.69
5. Intellectual Property
Finally, common-law systems recognize a variety of intellectual
property interests. The main forms here are patents, copyrights, trademarks,
and trade secrets. A number of jurisdictions recognize additional common-
law intellectual property interests, such as the right to prevent
misappropriation of information and the right of publicity.
The numerus clausus is probably at its weakest in the area of
intellectual property. To be sure, there is considerable stability in the
recognized forms of intellectual property, and federal law in the United
States preempts many attempts to create novel forms of intellectual
property as a matter of state law. 70 But there are some notable exceptions in
which judicial creativity in fashioning new intellectual-property interests
has been sanctioned.
Most prominently, in International News Service v. Associated Press,7'
the Supreme Court recognized a right to prevent the misappropriation of
information in news dispatches, even if the information is not copyrighted
and is not a trade secret.72 The Court insisted it was not creating a property
right in news, but simply enjoining a form of unfair competition in the form
of appropriating news gathered by others. 73 But both Justice Brandeis in
dissent74 and Judge Learned Hand in a later decision in the Second Circuit"
saw the decision as a mischievous encroachment on the principle that only
Congress may create new forms of intellectual property-in
other words, the numerus clausus. They were prescient: The doctrine of
69. Chafee, supra note 67, at 1013 (discussing the apparent lack of major adverse effects
from the lack of recognition of servitudes on chattels); Chafee, supra note 68, at 1254-55
(discussing the continued rarity of servitudes on chattels outside of resale price maintenance).
70. E.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989) (declaring
that a state statute prohibiting the copying of boat hulls is preempted); Compco Corp. v. Day-
Bright Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238-39 (1964) (declaring that a state unfair competition law
preventing the copying of industrial designs is preempted); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,
376 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1964) (same); Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1285-87 (9th Cir.
1999) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (stating that the Copyright Act
should preempt broad application of a state right of publicity). But cf Goldstein v. California,
412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973) (holding that a state statute prohibiting record "piracy" is not
preempted by federal copyright law). See generally Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual Property Law
and the Economics of Preemption, 76 IOWA L. REV. 959 (1991) (reviewing cases).
71. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
72. The decision had been anticipated in earlier cases involving retransmission of "news."
See, e.g., Nat'l Tel. News Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294 (7th Cir. 1902).
73. Int'l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 234-37, 240-41.
74. Id. at 262-67 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
75. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929).
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misappropriation of information has taken on a life of its own and continues
to be recognized as a common-law right in many jurisdictions.76
Even more strikingly, about half the states in recent years have
recognized a "right of publicity," which protects the images and voices of
celebrities from commercial exploitation without their consent." Slightly
more than half of the states recognizing the right have done so at least
initially as a matter of judicial lawmaking 7-which is clearly incompatible
with the numerus clausus principle. The confusion engendered by the many
conflicts among jurisdictions over the scope of the right has given rise to
calls, including a proposal by the American Bar Association, for uniform
federal legislation ratifying this new form of intellectual property.79
C. Judicial Recognition of the Numerus Clausus
The numerus clausus appears to function as a deeply entrenched
assumption of the common-law system of property rights. There are no
significant examples of judicial abolition of existing forms of property.
Moreover, courts in the modern era for the most part have declined to create
new ones. There are a few prominent exceptions to this latter
generalization, such as the judicial creation of the equitable servitude and
the recognition in some states of the doctrines of misappropriation of
information and the right of publicity. But these exceptions have been
confined to nonpossessory property rights and intellectual-property rights,
and often, as in the case of the right of publicity, there is great pressure for
legislative ratification of judicial innovations when they do occur. Still,
recognition of the concept by courts and commentators is remarkably
underdeveloped. At the level of doctrinal exposition, the numerus clausus is
almost-but not quite-invisible.
To the extent that there can be said to be a leading case, it is Johnson v.
Whiton.80 Royal Whiton devised certain land "to my granddaughter Sarah
A. Whiton and her heirs on her father's side." 8 The limitation on descent to
76. E.g., Bd. of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., 456 N.E.2d 84 (Ill. 1983); see Douglas G. Baird,
Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International News Service v. Associated
Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411, 422 (1983).
77. See generally J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY (1999)
(thoroughly examining the contours of the "right of publicity").
78. The most recent tally indicates that seventeen states have recognized the right of publicity
by judicial decision. In five of these states, the right is now recognized by statute. In addition, ten
states recognize the right solely as a matter of statute rather than judicial decision. Thus, the right
exists in some form in twenty-seven states. 1 id., § 6.1 [B], at 6-6.
79. See Symposium, Rights of Publicity: An In-Depth Analysis of the New Legislative
Proposals to Congress, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 209 (1998) (panel discussion).
80. 34 N.E. 542 (Mass. 1893).
81. Id. at 542. The will provided that one-third of Royal's estate was devised to Sarah, and
the land in question was part of the estate.
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the father's side of Sarah's family was inconsistent with the Massachusetts
law of intestate succession, which permitted property to descend from one
line of the family to another. Of course, the issue in the case was not
intestate succession, that is, inheritance, but the construction of a will.
Nevertheless, the court construed the provision of the will as an attempt to
create a "new kind of inheritance," that is, a new type of estate, which the
court said could not be done. 2 Sarah was held to have taken a fee simple
absolute, thereby frustrating the evident intentions of Royal Whiton.
Johnson v. Whiton has all the makings of a leading case. The facts are
simple. The opinion for the court was authored by Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., one of America's most celebrated jurists and an authority on the history
of the common law.83 The opinion's reasoning, as is typical of Holmes, is
tightly compressed, yet advanced with great self-assurance. It is hard,
however, to find signs that Johnson v. Whiton has entered into the
American legal consciousness (in the manner of, say, Pierson v. Posts).
The decision is not widely cited in later cases. It makes only cameo
appearances in the leading treatises, and then is cited for propositions other
than the prohibition against judicial creation of new kinds of estates. 5
Perhaps a better measure of the status of the numerus clausus as a legal
doctrine is the way in which courts resolve disputes that arise testing the
82. Id.
83. Holmes also made reference to the doctrine of fixed estates in Norcross v. James, 2 N.E.
946, 949 (Mass. 1885), and alluded to "the rule that new and unusual burdens cannot be imposed
on land" in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 407 (Boston, Little, Brown and
Co. 1923) (1881).
84. 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
85. The leading treatise that is still kept up to date is POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra
note 2, which contains sixteen volumes. The index does not refer to Johnson v. Whiton. See also
6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 26, § 26.100, at 544 n.3 (citing Johnson v. Whiton in
a discussion of restraints on alienation); 2 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 25,
§ 18.04, at 487 n.147 (1994) (citing Johnson v. Whiton in a discussion of the fee tail); 3 id.
§ 23.03, at 291 n.50 (citing Johnson v. Whiton in a discussion of remainders).
The treatment of the decision in first-year property casebooks is especially revealing.
Although reproduced as a principal decision in two casebooks (both co-authored by legal
historians), BARLOW BURKE ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PROPERTY LAW 221-23 (1999);
DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 2, at 457-58, Johnson v. Whiton receives only passing mention in
other leading casebooks. See BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 211 (noting the doctrine but
not Johnson v. Whiton); DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 2, at 205 (referring to Johnson v.
Whiton); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 561
(2d ed. 1997) (same). Most notably, neither the decision, nor the principle for which it stands, is
mentioned at all in most instructional materials. E.g., JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN PROPERTY LAW (4th ed. 1999) (containing no references in
the index to Johnson v. Whiton or the numerus clausus idea); RICHARD H. CHUSED, CASES,
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS IN PROPERTY (1st ed. 1998) (same); JOHN E. CRIBBET ET AL.,
PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 1996) (same); JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL,
PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1998) (same);
J. GORDON HYLTON ET AL., PROPERTY LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: CASES AND
MATERIALS (1998) (same); SANDRA H. JOHNSON ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS,
AND PROBLEMS (2d ed. 1998) (same); SHELDON F. KURTZ & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW (3d ed. 1999) (same).
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judicial commitment to the doctrine. Here too, the evidence does not give
much reason to believe that American lawyers are aware of the doctrine or
its centrality to the system of property rights.
For example, one issue implicating the doctrine that has arisen in
several jurisdictions concerns the proper construction of an instrument that
purports to grant a lease of property for the life of the tenant. Under the
system of estates in land, there is no such thing as a "lease for life." One
can create a life estate. And one can create a lease. But a lease must be
either a term of years, a periodic tenancy, a tenancy at will, or a tenancy at
sufferance.86 Thus, courts confronted with an instrument purporting to
create a "lease for life" have typically asked which common-law box best
matches the grantor's intentions: a life estate or a tenancy at will. 7 Yet
there is no evidence in these decisions that the courts are aware that they are
applying a foundational precept of property law, or that the assumption that
the interest must fit into one of the established forms reflects the same
general principle articulated in Johnson v. Whiton.8"
A more recent New York case89 confronting the lease-for-life problem
suggests that courts in the future may simply defer to the parties' intention
to create a new type of leasehold. The opinion attacked the argument in
favor of the tenancy at will-the harsh application of the numerus
clausus-as being grounded in the "antiquated notion" that a life estate
cannot be created without livery of seisin.9° This outcome was also
condemned as "violat[ing] the terms of the agreement and frustrat[ing] the
intent of the parties."9 1
As to whether the court was willing to follow the intent of the parties to
the point of recognizing a new type of estate-a lease for life-the decision
is ambiguous. Near the end of the opinion, the court characterized the
interest as a "life tenancy terminable at the will of the tenant," 92 which
sounds like a life estate (which can always be disclaimed by the life tenant).
Thus, the result that the court ultimately reached may have been to hold that
86. Supra note 25 and accompanying text.
87. Compare Thompson v. Baxter, 119 N.W. 797 (Minn. 1909) (life estate), with Nitschke v.
Doggett, 489 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 498 S.w.2d 339
(Tex. 1973) (tenancy at will).
88. This lack of awareness is also reflected in the best-selling casebook of Jesse Dukeminier
and James Krier. In discussing estates in land, the authors note the doctrine of "standardization of
estates" and cite to Johnson v. Whiton. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 2, at 204-05. But when
they turn to landlord-tenant law, and reproduce a case that presents the "lease for life" problem,
they make no mention in the notes or the Teacher's Manual of the relevance of the doctrine of
standardization of estates. Id. at 424-25 (notes following Garner v. Gerrish, 473 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y.
1984)); JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, TEACHER'S MANUAL: PROPERTY 188-90 (4th ed.
1998) (summary and commentary on Garner v. Gerrish).
89. Garner, 473 N.E.2d 223.
90. Id. at 224.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 225.
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the instrument created a life estate, which would be consistent with the
numerus clausus. However, the court also noted that both parties agreed
that the instrument created a lease, and it, too, spoke of the interest as a
lease. 93 This characterization, plus the court's condemnation of "antiquated
notion[s]" about established forms of property and its insistence on
resolving the issue in terms of the parties' intent, could mean that the court
saw no problem with enforcing the instrument in accordance with its terms,
as a "lease for life." 94 Read this way, the decision could foreshadow the
emergence of a regime in which property rights are assimilated to contract
rights.95
D. Summary
In the final analysis, the idea that property interests may be created only
in limited numbers of standardized forms has a very odd status in the
common law. If one observes what lawyers and judges do, it is clear that
the numerus clausus exerts a powerful hold on the system of property
rights. At the core of the system-the system of estates in land-there has
been little deviation from the doctrine of fixed estates. The major departures
that do exist, such as the creation of the equitable servitude and the right of
publicity, have been relatively few in number and have been concentrated
in fringe areas of property rights, such as nonpossessory interests and non-
core intellectual property. Moreover, from the perspective of the practicing
lawyer, the entire system presents the picture of a fixed menu of options
from which deviations will not be permitted. The chances of persuading a
court to create a new type of property in any particular case are too remote
to be taken seriously. In this respect, property law has always been and
continues to be very different from contract law.
93. Id. at 224.
94. Id. at 224-25.
95. Creeping "contractualization" of property is evident in other areas as well. See, e.g., Jezo
v. Jezo, 127 N.W.2d 246 (Wis. 1964) (holding that the presumption that joint tenants own equal
shares is subject to rebuttal by evidence of contrary intent). The new Restatement of Property
explicitly adopts a contractualized view of servitudes:
One of the basic principles underlying this Restatement is that the function of the law is
to ascertain and give effect to the likely intentions and legitimate expectations of the
parties who create servitudes, as it does with respect to other contractual
arrangements....
The general principles governing servitude interpretation stated in § 4.1 adopt the
model of interpretation used in contract law and displace the older interpretive model
used in servitudes law that emphasized the free use of land, sometimes at the expense
of frustrating intent.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES 494 (2000) (Introductory Note to Chapter 4);
see also id. §§ 4.1-.13, at 494-640 (setting forth an interpretive rule for servitudes based on the
intent of the parties and setting up default rules that can be displaced by evidence of the parties'
intent).
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If one examines the official doctrine and the reasoning of the few cases
that test the validity of the idea, however, the numerus clausus appears to
have penetrated the consciousness of common-law lawyers only weakly.
Perhaps the best characterization of the status of the numerus clausus in
American common law is that it is simply a fact about the way in which the
system of property rights operates. The fact is so patent and obvious, so
deeply entrenched, that it is rarely commented upon. But because it is so
rarely commented upon, common-law lawyers have little to say in its
defense when it is challenged.
Ill. MEASUREMENT COSTS, FRUSTRATION COSTS, AND THE
OPTIMAL STANDARDIZATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
What accounts for the widespread adherence to the numerus clausus,
not only in the common law but in postfeudal legal systems throughout the
world? To the extent that an explanation can be found in the American legal
literature, it focuses on a concern with undue restraints on alienation.96 In
Johnson v. Whiton, for example, Holmes stated that the conveyance to
Sarah "and her heirs on her father's side" could not be construed as written
because this would "put it out of the power of the owners to give a clear
title for generations." 97 The restraint on alienation presumably would occur
because of fragmentation of property rights-the interest would create an
open-ended class of potential claimants to the property.98 The resulting
bargaining difficulties would have created large transaction-cost barriers to
any exchange of the property, creating an undue restraint on alienation.99
The problem with this argument is that the system of estates in land is
sufficiently flexible that one can nearly always find a way to effectuate a
complicated conveyance. Thus, if Royal Whiton had conveyed "to Sarah
for life, remainder to her heirs on her father's side," the conveyance would
96. E.g., DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 2, at 449 (discussing the doctrine of fixed estates in a
section entitled "Estates in Land and the Policy Against Undue Restraints on Alienation");
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 2, at 204 ("Once the estates system developed, judges decided
that standardization of estates furthered alienability by facilitating subsequent transactions in the
same resources."); SINGER, supra note 85, at 560-61 (discussing the doctrine in a section entitled
"Rules Regulating Restrictions on Use or Ownership To Promote Marketability").
97. Johnson v. Whiton, 34 N.E. 542, 542 (Mass. 1893).
98. The interest created by Royal Whiton was of unclear import. It might have meant that
Sarah had a fee simple, but if she died intestate, the property could be inherited only on her
father's side. Alternatively, the interest might have operated something like a fee tail, descending
from generation to generation not to the issue of Sarah's body but to the heirs on her father's side.
Holmes seems to have assumed the latter construction. See id. (analogizing the conveyance to a
fee tail).
99. If one construes the interest to be a modified fee tail, see supra note 98, and assumes the
interests of the takers in tail cannot be defeated by a conveyance of the interest by those who
presently hold the property, then, as Holmes noted, this would "put it out of the power of the
owners to give a clear title for generations." Johnson, 34 N.E. at 542. The transaction costs, in
other words, would be enormous.
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have accomplished the grantor's apparent objectives, but in a way that did
not create a "new kind of inheritance." 00 This alternative conveyance,
however, would also have created a large web of potential claimants. The
transaction-cost barriers to exchange, and hence the practical restraint on
alienation, would still be large.' This suggests that the numerus clausus is
not in fact a very effective device for limiting undue restraints on
alienation.
The leading English case affirming what we call the numerus clausus
principle, Keppell v. Bailey,"°2 suggests a different rationale. Keppell
involved the conveyance of an iron works, in which the purchasers
covenanted on behalf of themselves and their successors and assigns to
acquire all limestone required by the works from a particular quarry and to
ship the limestone to the works on a particular railroad. The Court of
Chancery held that this type of agreement, although enforceable as a
contract between the original parties, did not fall within the recognized
types of servitudes enforceable against subsequent purchasers as a property
right running with the land. There was, however, no suggestion in the case
that the covenants worked an undue restraint on alienation;"3 indeed, the
works had recently been conveyed from the original purchasers to another
party. Instead, Lord Chancellor Brougham stressed the more systemic
consequences of allowing such "fancies," as they have been called,"° to be
enforced as property rights:
There can be no harm to allowing the fullest latitude to men in
binding themselves and their representatives, that is, their assets
real and personal, to answer in damages for breach of their
obligations. This tends to no mischief, and is a reasonable liberty to
bestow; but great detriment would arise and much confusion of
rights if parties were allowed to invent new modes of holding and
enjoying real property, and to impress upon their lands and
tenements a peculiar character, which should follow them into all
hands, however remote. Every close, every messuage, might thus
be held in several fashion; and it would hardly be possible to know
100. Johnson, 34 N.E. at 542.
101. If we assume that the conveyance as written created a kind of fee tail in the heirs on
Sarah's father's side, see supra note 98, then the class of potential claimants would not be known
until the last of Sarah's heirs on her father's side died out. This "indefinite failure of issue"
construction would create larger transaction costs than the proposed alternative.
102. 39 Eng. Rep. 1042 (Ch. 1834).
103. The opinion found that the covenants were not infirm on perpetuity grounds and did not
constitute an impermissible restraint of trade. Id. at 1046-47.
104. The Lord Chancellor said that novel forms of property cannot "be devised and attached
to property at the fancy or caprice of any owner." Id. at 1049. Later English commentators have
picked up on this and have referred to idiosyncratic interests not recognized by the law as
"fancies." Rudden, supra note 3, at 240.
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what rights the acquisition of any parcel conferred, or what
obligations it imposed.o5
In modem terminology, the Lord Chancellor thought that permitting
interests like the covenants in Keppell to be established as property rights
would create unacceptable information costs to third parties. In this Part, we
develop Lord Chancellor Brougham's germ of an insight by presenting a
theory of the numerus clausus based on optimal standardization of property
rights.' 06
A. Measurement-Cost Externalities
When individuals encounter property rights, they face a measurement
problem."7 In order to avoid violating another's property rights, they must
ascertain what those rights are. In order to acquire property rights, they
must measure various attributes, ranging from the physical boundaries of a
parcel, to use rights, to the attendant liabilities of the owner to others (such
as adjacent owners). Whether the objective is to avoid liability or to acquire
rights, an individual will measure the property rights until the marginal
costs of additional measurement equal the marginal benefits. When seeking
to avoid liability, the actor will seek to minimize the sum of the costs of
liability for violations of rights and the costs of avoiding those violations
through measurement. In the potential transfer situation, the individual will
measure as long as the marginal benefit in reduced error costs exceeds the
marginal cost of measurement.1
0 8
The need for standardization in property law stems from an externality
involving measurement costs: Parties who create new property rights will
not take into account the full magnitude of the measurement costs they
105. Keppell, 39 Eng. Rep. at 1049.
106. It is uncertain when this hostility toward the creation of new forms of property entered
English law. The attitude is present as early as Chudleigh's Case, I Co. Rep. 113b, 76 Eng. Rep.
261 (K.B. 1589-1595), where the judges of the King's Bench construed the Statute of Uses
narrowly so as to make every contingent remainder a legal estate in land (and hence destructible
under the Rule of Destructibility of Contingent Remainders). Otherwise, said Chief Judge
Popham, "no purchaser would be sure of his purchase without an Act of Parliament." 1 Co. Rep.
at 139a, 76 Eng. Rep. at 322.
107. Measurement costs are a reflection of information costs, and the terms can usually be
used interchangeably for our purposes. Measurement reduces uncertainty and is the quantification
of information; measurement, being observable, makes a model easier to operationalize. Yoram
Barzel, Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets, 25 J.L. & ECON. 27, 28 & n.3
(1982). On measurement costs in general, see, for example, id.; Roy W. Kenney & Benjamin
Klein, The Economics of Block Booking, 26 J.L. & ECON. 497 (1983); and Henry E. Smith,
Ambiguous Quality Changes from Taxes and Legal Rules, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 647 (2000).
108. For discussions of whether the buyer or the seller will incur measurement costs and
devices to minimize them, see, for example, Barzel, supra note 107; Victor P. Goldberg, The Gold
Ring Problem, 47 U. TORONTO L.J. 469 (1997), and Kenney & Klein, supra note 107, at 522-27.
[Vol. 110: 1
The Numerus Clausus Principle
impose on strangers to the title. An example illustrates." 9 Suppose one
hundred people own watches. A is the sole owner of a watch and wants to
transfer some or all of the rights to use the watch to B. The law of personal
property allows the sale of A's entire interest in the watch, or the sale of a
life estate in the watch, or the sale of a joint tenancy or tenancy in common
in the watch. But suppose A wants to create a "time-share" in the watch,
which would allow B to use the watch on Mondays but only on Mondays
(with A retaining for now the rights to the watch on all other days). As a
matter of contract law, A and B are perfectly free to enter into such an
idiosyncratic agreement. But A and B are not permitted by the law of
personal property to create a property right in the use of the watch on
Mondays only and to transfer this property right from A to B." l"
Why might the law restrict the freedom of A and B to create such an
unusual property right? Suppose, counterfactually, that such idiosyncratic
property rights are permitted. Word spreads that someone has sold a
Monday right in a watch, but not which of the one hundred owners did so.
If A now decides to sell his watch, he will have to explain that it does not
include Monday rights, and this will reduce the attractiveness of the watch
to potential buyers. Presumably, however, A will foresee this when he sells
the Monday rights, and is willing to bear the cost of that action in the form
of a lower sales price. But consider what will happen now when any of the
other ninety-nine watch owners try to sell their watches. Given the
awareness that someone has created a Monday-only right, anyone else
buying a watch must now also investigate whether any particular watch
does not include Monday rights. Thus, by allowing even one person to
create an idiosyncratic property right, the information processing costs of
all persons who have existing or potential interests in this type of property
go up. This external cost on other market participants forms the basis of our
explanation of the numerus clausus.
At this point, it is useful to distinguish three classes of individuals who
might be affected by the decision to create idiosyncratic property rights, or
fancies, as illustrated by Figure 1. First are the originating parties, who are
the participants to the transaction creating the fancy; this is A and B in
Figure 1. Second are the potential successors in interest to the asset that is
being subjected to the fancy. This would be anyone who might purchase
A's reserved rights (after the transfer to B) as well as anyone who succeeds
to the interest acquired by B. Potential successors in interest are shown as
109. A more complex hypothetical involving time shares in watches can be found in Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Unity of Property Rights 5-6 (Nov. 17, 1999) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal), to which our argument about information costs
also applies. See infra notes 112-113 and accompanying text.
110. Time shares are a creation of statute, and the various statutes appear to limit time shares
to real estate. Ellen R. Peirce & Richard A. Mann, Time-Share Interests in Real Estate: A Critical
Evaluation of the Regulatory Environment, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 9, 37-42 (1983).
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Cs and Ds in Figure 1. Finally, there are the other market participants,
people who will deal in or with watches other than the one over which A
and B have transacted. Other market participants include those selling and
acquiring rights in other watches such as E and F and G and H in Figure 1.
They also include all who must avoid violating property rights in all
watches, rights that are enforced against the world represented by I and J in
Figure 1.111 In the hypothetical example above, the other market participants
are the other ninety-nine watch owners and their successors in title, as well
as anyone who potentially might violate a property right in a watch.
FIGURE 1. THE CLASSES OF AFFECTED PARTIES
I J
E- fancyE------- F !A ,B G -- H
N1
C2  D2..
The difference between other possible explanations of the numerus
clausus and our information-cost theory can be understood in terms of this
three-way classification. Other explanations focus on the effect of novel
property rights on the originating parties and potential successors in
interests-the As, Bs, Cs, and Ds of the world. One may say that these
classes of individuals fall within the "zone of privity" designated by the
box with the dotted line in Figure 1. Our explanation, in contrast, focuses
on the effect of unusual property rights on other market participants-the
Es, Fs, Gs, Hs, Is, and Js of the world--classes of individuals who fall
outside the zone of privity. As we argue, explanations based on classes of
individuals within the zone of privity have difficulty identifying costs that
are not impounded into the price facing those who make the decision
whether to create the fancy in the first place. An explanation based on costs
incurred by classes of individuals outside the zone of privity does not have
this difficulty.
111. Thus, other market participants include those whose actual dealings with watches occur
by means other than consensual transactions.
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Consider first the originating parties, A and B. Some commentators
have attempted to argue that the creation of novel property rights can be
seen as giving rise to extemal costs further down the road for these
originating parties." 2 If A has sold a Monday interest in the watch to B,
what happens if B turns around and sells the right to D,? D, may be
relatively inaccessible or may be unacceptable to A for a variety of possible
reasons. The sale from B to D1 of the Monday right may thus lower the
value of the retained interest in A. Alternatively, after the sale of the
Monday interest to B, A might sell one of the remaining days to C, and this
may damage the value of B's interest. To avoid these sorts of problems, it is
argued, the law simply presumes that A would ordinarily want to block
future sales by B, and so for simplicity's sake just disallows the original
creation of a property right that could lead to such a transaction
altogether.'13
Yet it is problematic to label the impact of the B-to-D, sale of the
Monday right an externality to A. If A can foresee the problem that B might
further transfer ownership of the interest in the watch, then the cost of that
future transaction (discounted by its probability) should figure into A's
decision to sell the Monday interest to B in the first place. The risk of such
a future transaction to D, should be capitalized in the form of a lower
market value of A's rights."' Because the costs associated with this
contingency will be reflected in the price, there is no extemality toA.
Thus, focusing only on the potential detriment to the two original
parties to the transaction-A and B-makes it hard to see that there is any
legitimate reason for the law to intervene and prohibit the transaction. The
decision to create a time-share in the watch may turn out to be an
improvident one. But the law generally does not second-guess mundane
mistakes like an improvident sale. With some reluctance, the law may stop
an owner from burning down her own house."' But she can presumably
destroy a watch she owns. And if she can destroy the watch, there would
seem to be no reason why A cannot diminish its value by entering into an
112. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 109, at 5-6.
113. Id. at 6. In theory, if B tries to sell to D1, A might then try to buy out D1's interest. But
once D, has acquired the Monday right, the transfer to D, may be hard for A to undo.
Alternatively, A might contract in advance with B that A has a right to block such sales. But this
would run up against the rule against restraints on alienation.
114. In this hypothetical, the possibility of the sale to D, should lower the market value of the
rights A retains even if for some reason it did not lower the market value of the rights hived off to
B.
115. Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (declining to
enforce a will provision directing destruction of a house). Interestingly, John Austin uses the
opposite conclusion about this situation to illustrate his conception of ownership. 3 JOHN AUSTIN,
LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, 1861-1863, at 6 (1863) (" If I am the absolute owner of my house,
I may destroy it if I will. But I must not destroy it in such a manner as would amount to an injury
to any of my neighbors.").
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improvident sharing agreement that can lead to ownership of the watch
being fragmented among multiple and potentially antagonistic parties.
For similar reasons, the costs to potential successors in interest will also
be mediated through the price mechanism and so will not require legal
intervention. In the literature on fragmentation, it is often pointed out that
the creation of novel interests can be difficult for later individuals dealing
with the asset, such as C2 and D, to figure out or to undo. Even interests
that do not lead to fragmentation per se can be difficult for those in the
distant future to understand and take into account, and this is a reason to
adopt some degree of standardization in property rights." 6 But these costs
are not externalities to such decisions. If a fancy lowers the price that a
future purchaser will pay for an interest in the watch over which A and B
are transacting, the difficulties facing future Ds who might purchase any
interest in that watch-or who might lend to the owner of the watch while
taking a security interest in the watch-will lead to a lower price than D,
might pay for an unrestricted watch." 7 This lower price will be reflected in
a lower market value the instant that the fancy creating such difficulties is
created. Because the difficulties to the potential successors in interest (the
Ds) are reflected in costs facing A (and B) now, there is no externality and
no need to intervene.
Again, limited foresight might prevent A or B from making a
completely accurate forecast of the costs to those who deal with the asset in
the future."' This does not, however, furnish a basis for taking the decision
116. This argument based on the effects on potential successors in interest has been made
most clearly in Rose, supra note 11, at 214-15. See infra Section IV.B.
117. Baird and Jackson discuss the information costs to potential creditors involved with a
particular asset, who would in our classification be counted as potential successors in interest.
Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of Property, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 299, 307-09 (1984). As with the costs to successors in tide, the costs to potential
successors in interest should be reflected in a lower price to the creating parties, thus presenting
no externality. But as with successors in title, systems like recording are likely to be more cost-
effective than the numerus clausus for the informational problems that remain. See id. at 303-07.
118. The intertemporal aspect of property interests also raises the much-discussed question of
intergenerational equity. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE
107-38, 168-227 (1980) (discussing justice over time); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 284-
93 (1971) (discussing justice between generations); LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE
DEAD HAND 32-38 (1955) (discussing dead-hand control); Richard Epstein, Justice Across the
Generations, 67 TEx. L. REv. 1465 (1989) (discussing the problem of intergenerational equity);
Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1
(1992) (discussing the structure of the problem of intergenerational control); Jeffrey E. Stake,
Darwin, Donations, and the Illusion of Dead Hand Control, 64 TUL. L. REv. 705 (1990) (same).
Even if property law might be used to change the discount rate of present owners of property, we
still would want the discount rate to be the same with respect to the different components of the
endowment left for future generations. See Stephen F. Williams, Running Out: The Problem of
Exhaustible Resources, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 186 (1978) (listing components of the legacy to
future generations and pointing out that traditional economic analysis concludes that "[flor any
given level of sacrifice that people are willing to make, society should adjust the composition of
the endowment so that the marginal values of each component of the endowment are equal").
Whatever one might say about the usefulness of doctrines such as the Rule Against Perpetuities in
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out of the hands of the original transactors, unless officials are in a better
position to estimate these costs than are the originating parties, who are
closest to the transaction and who face the costs most directly." 9 Generally
speaking, this is not likely.
Further, there are less drastic ways to deal with improvident
arrangements that cause excessive costs for parties and potential successors
in interest than mandating the standardization of rights through the numerus
clausus principle. 20 For example, the law could adopt a default rule against
time-shares in personal property with the opportunity to opt out. In such a
case, whether B could sell some of his interest to D, would be governed by
rules of contract interpretation, and property rights would arise (or not)
accordingly. No doubt this strictly contractarian approach would be
cumbersome. One would have to worry about whether D, the potential
purchaser of B's interest, knew whether A had contracted around the default
rule prohibiting such interests. Thus, some requirement of notice might be
necessary. But from a contractarian point of view, the problems of notice
and complexity of property rights can be solved through default rules. The
last thing one would expect would be an outright ban on types of property
rights.
There is, however, a much more straightforward problem of
externalities associated with the creation of idiosyncratic property rights as
illustrated in the watch hypothetical. These are the effects on the third class
of individuals identified above outside the zone of privity-the other
market participants. When A creates the Monday right, this can raise the
information costs of third parties. If the law allows A to create a Monday
interest, individuals wishing to buy watches or bailees asked to repair
watches will have to consider the possibility that any given watch is a
Monday-only watch (or a watch for any other proper subset of days of the
week) rather than a full-week watch. While A and B might be expected to
take into account the market-value-lowering effect of undesirable
idiosyncratic rights when third parties like C or D consider purchasing
property in this watch, they will not take into account the more general
effect on processing costs created by the existence of such rights when F is
considering a purchase of rights in E's watch, or I and J are worried about
violating property rights.'
this regard, the numerus clausus seems like a very blunt and ineffective instrument for achieving
intergenerational equity. Standardizing the basic building blocks of property will probably have
little effect on the discount rate or on the amount of an asset left for future generations.
119. For more discussion, see infra note 189 and accompanying text.
120. Rose discusses some of these methods of dealing with improvident rights by recording
acts or through adjustment ex post. Rose, supra note 11, at 213-15. For more discussion, see infra
note 190 and accompanying text.
121. The externality here is an informational one. Other informational externalities that have
received increasing attention in economics include the possible effect of speculation in reducing
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A and B may have subjective reasons for creating property rights based
on days of the week. But, the possible existence of such rights will cause
information costs for others-such as E, F, G, H, I, and J-to rise. Those
considering whether to purchase property rights in watches will have more
to investigate: They will have to assure themselves that they are getting all
the days of the week that they want. Furthermore, they will have to worry
about dimensions of division and elaboration that perhaps no one has yet
thought of, making the acquisition of any watch more uncertain as well as
riskier.122 With an indefinite set of types of rights, these costs will be higher
than where parties, especially unsophisticated ones, are restricted to the
limited menu the law allows. Furthermore, because property rights are in
rem, all those who might violate property rights, accidentally or not, must
know what they are supposed to respect.'23 An indefinite set of types of
rights will raise the cost of preventing violations through investigation of
rights.
To return to our hypothetical world of one-hundred watch owners,
suppose the value of creating the Monday-only right to A is $10, but the
existence of this idiosyncrasy increases processing costs by $1 for all watch
owners. The net benefit to A is $9, but the social cost is $90. As this
example suggests, idiosyncratic property rights create a common-pool
problem.'24 The marginal benefits of the idiosyncrasy are fully internalized
the informativeness of prices, Jeremy C. Stein, Informational Externalities and Welfare-Reducing
Speculation, 95 J. POL. ECON. 1123 (1987), and the circumstances under which socially costly
bait and switch will be attractive to sellers, Edward P. Lazear, Bait and Switch, 103 J. POL. ECON.
813 (1995). The informational externality we identify is not a pecuniary externality. A pecuniary
externality is one mediated by the price system and cannot lead to inefficiency. For example, if
consumers in Chicago love raspberries, this might raise the price for consumers in New York, but
the disutility of the New Yorkers is not a technological externality but a pecuniary one. See, e.g.,
ANDREAS A. PAPANDREOU, EXTERNALITY AND INSTITUTIONS 18-21 (1994); Frank H. Knight,
Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost, 38 Q.J. ECON. 582 (1924). In our example, by
contrast, the confusion caused by idiosyncratic rights is not fully reflected in price but is rather the
effect of using an open-access resource like a congested road. Infra notes 124-125 and
accompanying text.
122. According to Knight's well-known distinction, risk is randomness that is quantifiable in
terms of a probability distribution, and uncertainty is randomness that is not. FRANK H. KNIGHT,
RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921). Insurance may be used to shift the risk of not receiving
a property interest with the anticipated market value. But in a world in which owners are free to
create previously unknown customized property rights, third parties would presumably face not
just risk but uncertainty. The uncertainty of such a regime might not be insurable.
123. In Hohfeld's terms, in rem rights are multital rather than paucital. WESLEY NEWCOMB
HOHFELD, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning 11, in
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS As APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL
ESSAYS 65, 71-86 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923).
124. The problems of a common-pool resource were first studied by Jens Warming, Om
"Grundrente" af Fiskegrunde, 49 NATIONALOKONOMISK TIDSSKRIFr 495 (1911), translated in
Peder Andersen, "On Rent of Fishing Grounds": A Translation of Jens Warming's 1911 Article,
with an Introduction, 15 HiST. POL. ECON. 391 (1983); Jens Warming, Aalegaardsretten,
69 NATIONAL0KONOMISK TIDSSKRIFT 151 (1931). The analysis was independently discovered by
H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL.
EcON. 124 (1954), and extended by Steven N.S. Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the
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to the owner of the property right, but the owner bears only a fraction of the
general measurement costs thereby created. Overall, the creation of external
costs associated with this common-pool problem is likely to proceed
beyond the optimal level.'2 The problem cannot be resolved by side
payments from the remaining ninety-nine to A, because the transaction
costs are virtually certain to be prohibitive. Consequently, since an
individual's interest in creating the nonstandard right-the extra benefit
from using it rather than the next best alternative-is less than the
additional measurement costs imposed on the other market participants,
there is a rationale for the law to prohibit the creation of this kind of
idiosyncratic right.
One way to control the external costs of measurement to third parties is
through compulsory standardization of property rights. 26 Standardization
reduces the costs of measuring the attributes of such rights.127 Limiting the
number of basic property forms allows a market participant or a potential
violator to limit his or her inquiry to whether the interest does or does not
have the features of the forms on the menu. Fancies not on the closed list
need not be considered because they will not be enforced. When it comes to
the basic legal dimensions of property, limiting the number of forms thus
makes the determination of their nature less costly. The "good" in question
here might be considered to be the prevention of error in ascertaining the
attributes of property rights. Standardization means less measurement is
required to achieve a given amount of error prevention. Alternatively, one
Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource, 13 J.L. & ECON. 49, 66-67 (1970). A wider audience for the
analysis was gained by Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCi. 1243 (1968).
125. The problem here in fact may be worse than that of the prototypical common pool in
which one of n participants bears only lln of the costs of his or her actions. The choice of the
degree of idiosyncrasy in any given transaction may not be a continuous one. This can mean that
in the system of property rights, some rightholders and transactors will not be concerned with
small differences in idiosyncrasy and marketability at the margin.
126. We consider the failure of other methods of controlling the costs of measuring basic
property rights in Section IV.A infra.
127. This effect of standardization-however the standard is achieved-is familiar from
many areas, including manufacturing, see Charles P. Kindleberger, Standards as Public,
Collective and Private Goods, 36 KYKLos 377, 378, 384 (1983) (stating that standardization in
manufacturing has the twin benefits of facilitating economies of scale and of reducing transaction
costs by, inter alia, reducing the need for monitoring); health care information, see William M.
Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM.
L. Rnv. 1701, 1741-42 (1999) (stating that standardization carries with it many benefits, including
the reduction of "data collection and processing costs"); and securities design, see FRANKLIN
ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND RISK SHARING 123, 311-12, 333 (1994)
(interpreting results of studies as reflecting a discount for unfamiliar securities). See also Alan
Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples
of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1401-29 (1983) (showing that, just as
with price diversity where consumers prefer one price, the variety of contract terms can affect
consumer search costs).
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can say that standardization increases the productivity of any given level of
measurement efforts.
128
One would expect standardization to have the most value in connection
with the dimensions of property rights that are least visible, and hence the
most difficult for ordinary observers to measure. The tangible attributes of
property, such as its size, shape, color, or texture, are typically readily
observable and hence can be relatively easily measured by third parties. In
the watch example, the watch can be a Timex or a Rolex and can be any
size or color, and so forth. These physical attributes, and of course the
price, are relatively easy for third parties to process using their senses, and
thus there is less to be gained from standardizing them.'29 The legal
dimensions of property are less visible and less easy to comprehend,
especially when they deviate from the most familiar forms such as the
undivided fee simple.'30 Thus, one would expect the effort to lower third-
party information costs through standardization to focus on the legal
dimension of ownership. 3'
128. Of course, standardization of ownership forms is not the only device used by the law to
reduce information costs to third parties about property rights. See Carol M. Rose, Possession as
the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 73, 88 (1985) (noting that the standards for
determining possession are based on "a specific vocabulary within a structure of symbols
approved and understood by a commercial people").
129. For a discussion of how the configuration of boundaries can serve to make attributes
harder to process and thereby deter strategic behavior, see Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property
Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 147-48, 161-64 (2000).
130. Conditions that cut short a possessory interest or trigger the creation of a future interest,
see supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text, are one instance in which the law permits
significant variation in an attribute of property rights that is not visible. These conditions,
however, are nearly always expressed in "lay language," describing an attribute such as age
("when she reaches twenty-one"), marital status ("so long as he does not remarry"), or uses
("provided it is used for school purposes"). It may be that such conditions are more
understandable to nonlegally trained market participants than are the legal dimensions of the
different building blocks of property themselves (e.g., fee simple, contingent remainder,
easement). In any event, these sorts of conditions are today almost always found in trusts, where
they serve as guides to the trustee in distributing the fruits of the trust among different
beneficiaries. Other market participants deal only with the underlying trust assets, which are held
by the trustee in fee simple. The widespread use of trusts, in other words, has made possible the
continued use of nonstandardized conditions, without at the same time imposing large
measurement costs on other market participants.
131. It might be thought that courts and other officials (such as tax authorities) would be
among the third parties whose information costs need lowering. This is a consideration, but the
question remains why standardization in property law is different from the defaults used in
contract law. As for taxing authorities, the numerus clausus might ease processing, but, to a great
extent, tax-specific concepts of ownership may need to be devised anyway. See Noel B.
Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without Realization: A "Revolutionary" Approach
to Ownership, 47 TAX L. REv. 725, 727 (1992) (noting the absence of a comprehensive definition
of ownership under the tax code, arguing that the search for a single taxable owner is misguided,
and proposing to determine ownership based on financial interest just as Section 1286 of the
Internal Revenue Code treats a bond and its coupons as separate pieces of property).
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B. Frustration Costs and the Language of Property Rights
If the only concern were in reducing third-party measurement costs,
then there should be only one mandatory package of property rights,
presumably a simple usufruct or an undivided fee simple. But
standardization imposes its own costs. Mandatory rules sometimes prevent
the parties from achieving a legitimate goal cost-effectively. Enforcing
standardization can therefore frustrate the parties' intentions.
Although the numerus clausus sometimes frustrates parties' objectives,
often those objectives can be realized by a more complex combination of
the standardized building blocks of property. 3 For example, sophisticated
parties with good legal advice can create the equivalent of a lease "for the
duration of the war" by entering into a long-term lease determinable if the
war ends.'33 The fact that the numerus clausus is in this sense "avoidable"
does not mean that it is trivial: Even if the standardization effected by the
numerus clausus principle does not absolutely bar the parties from realizing
their ends, this standardization comes at a price.'34 The effect is roughly that
of price discrimination: Parties willing to pay a great deal for an objective
can achieve it by incurring higher planning and implementation costs.' 35
Furthermore, the design and implementation costs imposed by the numerus
clausus function as a sort of "pollution tax" that should deter parties from
insisting on overusing hard-to-process property forms, thereby placing
higher processing burdens on market participants and especially courts.
The ability of the system of property rights to limit the degree of
frustration that comes from standardization can be grasped by comparing
that system to another metaphorical network: language.'36 The inventory of
property rights can be analogized to the lexicon of a language, and the rules
for combining property rights are like a language's grammar. In the case of
both property law and language, there is a potentially infinite range of
things one can do with the limited vocabulary and rules available.
132. Supra note 100 and accompanying text.
133. Supra note 29.
134. In the context of corporate law, Bernard Black argues that rules that appear to be
mandatory can be trivial for four reasons, one of them being the rule's avoidability. Bernard S.
Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 542,
544 (1990). However, the greater the transaction costs of contracting around a rule, the more it
will fall toward the mandatory end of the spectrum from weak defaults to strong defaults to
mandatory rules. See supra note 24.
135. Furthermore, as Black notes, one should expect triviality in areas of law in which most
parties are sophisticated. Black, supra note 134, at 546. We argue that the numerus clausus causes
property law to vary in avoidability (one of Black's senses of triviality) according to the
sophistication of the parties. Furthermore, corporate law is an area in which the participants are
typically concerned with liquidity, and where liquidity is a primary concern, there is an incentive
to conform even to nonmandatory standards. Infra notes 167-169 and accompanying text.
136. Cf ROBERT G. NATELSON, MODERN LAW OF DEEDS TO REAL PROPERTY § 2.1, at 12-
13 (1992) (analogizing estates in land to systems of measurement and the alphabet).
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In both language 'and property, standardizing the building blocks will
cause some frustration of purposes, but the analogy to language suggests
why this may be tolerable. If there were only one form of tailor-made
property right for each objective people might have, then limiting such
rights would have a severe effect on the objectives people could pursue
with the law's aid. But if building blocks can be combined in many ways to
serve objectives that cannot be served with the building blocks themselves,
then the degree of frustration depends on how well and how easily the
building blocks can be combined to serve those objectives. That is, it is
important to know the generative power of the system of property rights.
In this respect, the set of outputs of the property system is potentially
infinite for reasons analogous to those that capture the infinity of sentences
of a language. The set of property rights bundles is potentially infinite
because, like some of the rules of language, some rules for forming
property rights are recursive: These rules can feed into themselves.137 For
example, a fee simple can be physically divided and divided yet again, or a
lessee can create a sublease and the sublessee a (sub)sublease, etc. Also
leading to an infinity of outputs are rules that permit multiple owners; 138 for
example, a fee simple can be divided into tenancies in common with any
number of concurrent owners or a single lease can be executed with
multiple lessees. 3 9 And the rules permitting physical and temporal division
can be combined with the rules permitting multiple ownership. Thus, again
as with language, relatively simple systems can potentially have great
generative capacity or expressive power." If so, then the limitations on the
137. The output of a recursive rule contains a constituent of the same category as the input to
the rule. Among the linguistic phenomena that call for a model including a recursive rule is the
complement clause beginning with "that": "Pat said/believed that Chris is sick," "Leslie
said/believed that Pat said/believed that Chris is sick," etc. A sentence can consist of "that" plus
another sentence (which can in turn consist of "that" plus another sentence, etc.). See, e.g., IVAN
A. SAG & THOMAS WASOW, SYNTACTIC THEORY: A FORMAL INTRODUCTION 36, 259 (1999).
138. An analogous linguistic example would be the "and on" phenomenon. "Some sentences
go on and on" is a sentence in English, as is "Some sentences go on and on and on," as is "Some
sentences go on and on and on and on." For a good discussion of this source of infinity in syntax,
see id. at 27-29. This is not the same as recursion, as reflected in the flat structure of the "and on"
phenomenon; recursion, in contrast, creates a "nested" tree structure. The property analogy would
be to contrast the simple horizontal division of an interest into subinterests with the successive
divisions of subinterests creating more than one level.
139. As argued in Section IV.H infra, the law does not intervene in any strong anti-
fragmentarian way here, but this is not relevant to the present point, which concerns the
"expressive power" of the property system.
140. In syntax, generative capacity or power is measured by the set of outputs that a given
type of system can produce. E.g., JOHN E. HOPCROFr & JEFFREY D. ULLMAN, INTRODUCTION TO
AUTOMATA THEORY, LANGUAGES, AND COMPUTATION 217-32 (1979); BARBARA H. PARTEE ET
AL., MATHEMATICAL METHODS IN LINGUISTICS 451-53, 561-63 (1990). See generally THE
FORMAL COMPLEXITY OF NATURAL LANGUAGE (Walter J. Savitch et al. eds., 1987). Expressive
power refers to the range of meanings that can be expressed in a given language (however
cumbersomely). Claims that certain languages cannot express particular notions have turned out to
be false. For a famous example, see EKKEHART MALOTKI, HOPI TIME: A LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS
OF THE TEMPORAL CONCEPTS IN THE HOPI LANGUAGE (1983), which refutes claims by Benjamin
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vocabulary of property rights may not lead to as much frustration of parties'
objectives as one might first think.
Quite complex structures-of property rights or sentences-can be
constructed from a limited number of standard building blocks.
Importantly, these complexes are easier to process for the very reason that
they are built with the standard building blocks. In language, sentences that
obey grammatical constraints are likely to be easier to parse than are
ungrammatical sentences, 4 ' something that Chomsky pointed out at the
dawn of his research program on generative grammar.'42 Similarly, in
property, a complex of property rights built from a small number of
standard building blocks is likely to be easier for third parties to process
than functionally equivalent complex property rights for which third parties
must figure out the nature of the building blocks.'43
As is generally true of analogies, likening the system of property rights
to human language only gets us so far. The two networks resemble each
other on the frustration cost side of the ledger: The generative power of
each leads to great flexibility. Much can be done with a limited vocabulary.
On the measurement cost side of the inquiry, however, the system of
property looks like language only in certain specialized contexts. Everyday
language is a flexible standard: It is permissible and often beneficial to coin
new words, and this does not usually lead to a degree of confusion costs
Whorf that the Hopi language lacks any means of expressing time. Cf GEOFFREY K. PULLUM,
THE GREAT ESKIMO VOCABULARY HOAX: AND OTHER IRREVERENT ESSAYS ON THE STUDY OF
LANGUAGE 159-71 (1991) (debunking claims regarding a large number of Eskimo words for
snow).
141. Linguists continue to debate about what factors other than nongrammaticality tend to
impede or promote processing. CARSON T. SCHOTZE, THE EMPIRICAL BASE OF LINGUISTICS:
GRAMMATICALITY JUDGMENTS AND LINGUISTIC METHODOLOGY 31-32, 160-64 (1996).
142. Interestingly, Chomsky's famous example demonstrating that syntactic or grammatical
well-formedness is distinct from semantic intelligibility-" Colorless green ideas sleep
furiously"-was introduced in a discussion that also pointed out some correlation between
grammaticality (syntactic well-formedness) and ease of processing. The famous example is easier
to remember and to produce with natural intonation than are permutations like "Furiously sleep
ideas green colorless." NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES 15-16 (1957).
143. Thus, it is not necessarily correct that creating a tenancy for the duration of the war in a
way that satisfies the numerus clausus-a term of years determinable-conveys no more
information to third parties than would enforcing a tenancy "for the duration of the war" directly
as a matter of the intentions of the parties. To a sophisticated lawyer reviewing the instruments, a
lease for a term of, say, ten years, determinable on the end of the war, has a more certain meaning
than does a lease "for the duration of the war." The former clearly lasts for a full ten years if the
war lasts that long, and it clearly terminates earlier if the war ends before the ten years are up. The
latter has no established meaning. Some courts have construed such an interest to be a term of
years, some a periodic lease, and some a tenancy at will. Supra note 28. Nor is the problem solved
by dropping the numerus clausus and saying that all leases will be enforced in accordance with
the intentions of the parties. There still may be great uncertainties about when the war ends. Does
it end when an armistice is declared, or when demobilization occurs, or when a peace treaty is
signed? These conundrums affect both alternatives, but in the case of the term of years
determinable, we at least know that the lease continues until the debate over when the war ends is
resolved. If we enforce a lease for the duration of the war according to its terms, the status of the
tenant while the parties debate the meaning of "the end of the war" is more uncertain.
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that requires standardization by a central authority. 144 The grammar of a
language is more standardized, but again this generally occurs
spontaneously. Standardizing property and language may not create
massive frustration costs because of each system's generative power, but
the source of the standardization is different in the two networks. We return
to the question of the source of standards in Section IV.C.
C. Optimal Standardization and the Numerus Clausus
We are now in a position to see how the numerus clausus functions to
promote the optimal standardization of property rights. From a social point
of view, the objective should be to minimize the sum of measurement (and
error) costs, frustration costs, and administrative costs. In other words, what
we want is not maximal standardization-or no standardization-but
optimal standardization. Fortunately, standardization comes in degrees.
There is a spectrum of possible approaches to property rights, ranging from
total freedom of customization on the one hand to complete regimentation
on the other. Neither of these endpoints on the spectrum is likely to
minimize social costs. Extreme standardization would frustrate many of the
purposes to which property rights are put. On the other hand, total freedom
to customize rights would create large third-party measurement and error
costs and high administrative costs. Attention should focus on the middle
range of the spectrum. Starting from a position of complete regimentation,
permitting additional forms of property rights should reduce frustration
costs by more than it increases measurement and error costs to third parties
and administrative costs. Conversely, if one starts from a position of
complete customization of rights, increasing the degree of standardization
should lower measurement and error costs and administrative costs by more
than the attendant frustration costs will rise.
Consider a simple model of the choice of the number of property forms,
illustrated in Figure 2. Along the x-axis is the variable p, the number of
forms of property, and along the y-axis is the measure of marginal changes
to societal wealth.
144. Infra notes 171-173 and accompanying text.
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FIGURE 2. OPTIMAL NUMBER OF PROPERTY FORMS
Number of Forms
MP = marginal cost of measuring (delineating and processing) property rights
FP = marginal benefit in reducing frnstration of parties' objectives
The number of forms of property is subject to a tradeoff between
measurement and error costs on the one hand and frustration costs on the
other. As the number of property forms (p) increases, error costs and
measurement costs also increase. 145 Moreover, in this model we assume that
the simplest and most widely applicable property rights will be adopted
first; thus the fee simple is represented in the smallest set of property forms
(to the left on the x-axis in Figure 2). Marginal error and measurement costs
therefore increase with the number of forms. The curve labeled M,
represents the marginal costs of setting up and processing property rights.
As p increases, the marginal costs of measurement increase (M is positive
and increasing as p increases), reflecting the increased costs of
measurement and error associated with more-and more specialized and
complicated-property forms." The number of forms may range from 0 to
145. The choice bears some resemblance to the choice of the number of commons. See
Barry C. Field, The Evolution of Property Rights, 42 KYKLoS 319, 321-22, 328-29 (1989).
146. For the more complicated property forms, marginal processing costs are higher because
of complexity. To the extent that these property forms are less widely applicable than ones
"earlier" on the x-axis, there are fewer instances of the property form over which to spread any
fixed costs in setting up and learning to process the property form.
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Q, which is defined as the number of property forms that would emerge in a
regime of total customization. The other curve, labeled Fp, is a marginal
benefit curve; it represents the marginal savings in frustration costs from
changes in p. As p increases, the marginal frustration costs saved decrease
(FP is positive and decreasing as p increases), because as we move from the
fee simple to more specialized forms, the addition of each form saves less
in frustration costs. Thus, movements toward more forms of property yield
(increasingly smaller) benefits in terms of reduced frustration costs from
efforts to achieve goals that the menu of property forms does not directly
allow.
The numerus clausus principle can be seen from this perspective as a
device that moves the system of property rights in the direction of the
optimal level of standardization, that is, p,.147 By creating a strong
presumption against judicial recognition of new forms of property rights,
the numerus clausus imposes a brake on efforts by parties to proliferate new
forms of property rights. On the other hand, by grandfathering in existing
forms of property, and permitting legislative creation of new forms, the
numerus clausus permits some positive level of diversification in the
recognized forms of property. We do not argue that any particular number
of property forms is in fact optimal. Nor do we argue that the forms
currently recognized by the common law are ideal and beyond
improvement. We do submit, however, that the numerus clausus strikes a
rough balance between the extremes of complete regimentation and
complete freedom of customization, and thus leads to a system of property
rights that is closer to being optimal than that which would be produced by
either of the extreme positions.
D. Information Costs and the Dynamics of Property
Finally, our explanation of the numerus clausus generates some general
predictions about the way in which property regimes will change over time:
As the costs of standardization to the parties and the government shift, we
expect the optimal degree of standardization to rise or fall. Consider the rise
of registers of interests in real property, that is, recording acts. This device
lowers the costs of notice; it is an alternative method of lowering
information costs.
1 4 8
147. Rudden acknowledges the possible role of standardization in reducing information costs,
but he does not draw out its implications. He concludes that there is no economic justification for
the numerus clausus, and in particular, he thinks that the possibility of contracting for
idiosyncratic rights makes standardization through the numerus clausus irrelevant. Rudden, supra
note 3, at 253-54. That is, he appears to assume the correctness of the irrelevance objection, which
we criticize in Section IV.C infra.
148. In nineteenth-century England, those arguing for reform in the law of property saw
limitation of the types of property interests and compulsory registration of titles as alternative
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M, = marginal costs of measuring property rights without registration
MI, = marginal costs of measuring property rights with registration
FP = F'= marginal benefit in reducing frustration of parties' objectives
The effects of adopting a system of registration are illustrated
graphically in Figure 3 above. The effect of cheaper information is to shift
the marginal costs of property forms in terms of processing inward; M
shifts downward to a position more like that of MI' in Figure 3, and thus the
optimal number of property forms increases, from p* to p'*. As the
methods to simplify conveyancing that might be used together. See, e.g., SECOND REPORT MADE
TO His MAJESTY BY THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE LAW OF ENGLAND
RESPECTING REAL PROPERTY 4-21 (n.p. 1830) (describing the insecurity of title and costs of
investigating, noting the need for a uniform system, and advocating a general registry for real
property); THIRD REPORT MADE TO HIS MAJESTY BY THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO
INQUIRE INTO THE LAW OF ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL PROPERTY 4-20 (n.p. 1832) (noting the
inconvenience and costs of nonuniform and complex systems of estates across England); W.S.
HOLDSWORTH, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAND LAW 315-18 (1927) (discussing
the necessary emergence of legislation to fill obvious gaps); JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY 884 (J.M. Robson ed., Univ. of Toronto Press 1965) (1848) (criticizing the
law of real property for its uncertainty, complexity, lack of registry, consequent expensive
formalities, and costly legal proceedings); FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAND LAWS 171-74
(London, MacMillan 1896) (describing the cost and trouble of investigating title in nineteenth-
century England, noting that registering and simplifying property law were main solutions
advocated, and describing reforms); see also C.E. Thomhill, How To Simplify Our Titles, 5 L.Q.
REv. 11 (1889) (documenting the argument in England between those who wished to reduce costs
of investigating title by simplification of estates and those who advocated notice through a land
register, and taking the former position).
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marginal costs of defining property forms shift inward, the optimal point of
standardization shifts to less standardization. Similarly, in the case of
security interests, the provision of notice through filing allowed the
loosening of the earlier quite strict limits on the types of security interests
permitted. '49
Likewise, the more recent move toward increased use of contract
principles in areas like electronic commerce fits in well with the
information-cost theory of the numerus clausus. Notice is arguably easier to
furnish (if not to process) when, for example, rights to digital content are
being transferred, and notice of restrictions and other features of rights
transferred are technologically not difficult to provide. 5 ' Also fitting this
pattern are recent criticisms of negotiability as being superseded by
technology.' Negotiability imposes very strict formality requirements
precisely in order to reduce the need to measure the reliability of an
instrument. But when technology furnishes alternative means of promoting
reliance (including lowering the need to measure risk), there is less need for
the standardization provided for by the requirements of negotiability. In
general, to the extent that technological change allows cheaper notice of
relevant interests, the need for standardization by the law will be somewhat
diminished. Just as the rise of land registers allowed some loosening of the
numerus clausus, so too technology that lowers information costs can be
expected to weaken the numerus clausus further.
IV. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
We anticipate a variety of objections to our optimal standardization
theory of the numerus clausus, which we collect under three headings. The
first we call "libertarian" objections, because they share the common
theme that government-mandated standardization is not necessary in order
to reduce third-party measurement costs. The second we call the
"antifragmentation" objection, because it posits that the numerus clausus is
designed not to reduce third-party information costs but rather to restrict the
fragmentation of ownership. The third we call the "irrelevance" objection;
basically, it posits that virtually anything one can do with property can also
149. E.g., Robert Charles Clark, Abstract Rights Versus Paper Rights Under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 84 YALE L.J. 445, 476-78 (1975); Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. (forthcoming Dec. 2000)
(manuscript at 18, on file with The Yale Law Journal).
150. E.g., Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the
"Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 120-29 (1997).
151. E.g., Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems,
44 UCLA L. REV. 951 (1997); Symposium on Negotiability in an Electronic Environment,
31 IDAHO L. REV. 679 (1995); Jane Kaufman Winn, Couriers Without Luggage: Negotiable
Instruments and Digital Signatures, 49 S.C. L. REV. 739, 742 (1998).
[Vol. 110: 1
The Numerus Clausus Principle
be done by contract, thus rendering the standardizing features of the
numerus clausus otiose. We argue that none of these various arguments is
ultimately persuasive.
A. Libertarian Objections
The argument that government-mandated standardization of property
forms, that is, the numerus clausus, is not necessary comes in three forms.
The first posits that the government need not standardize because third-
party informational needs can be supplied just as effectively by requiring
notice of idiosyncratic property forms. The second, which draws upon the
burgeoning literature on network effects, argues that government-mandated
standardization is unnecessary because standardization would occur without
government guidance. The third is that standardization can be supplied by
private organizations and associations rather than the government. We
address in turn each of these variations on the libertarian theme.
1. Notice Cures All
An emphasis on freedom of contract is characteristic of a critique of
certain manifestations of the numerus clausus offered by libertarians. Not
surprisingly, libertarians see the standardization of property rights as
standing in the way of parties' exercise of contractual freedom. The
libertarian argument has been made most forcefully by Richard Epstein in
his call to abolish the existing restrictions on servitudes.'52 In his view, legal
intervention is needed only to provide notice by recordation of privately
created interests. As long as such interests are recorded, they may take any
form the parties choose.
For Epstein, the function of recordation is to identify to prospective
purchasers the individual with whom one has to deal in order to acquire
title.'53 Because land is permanent and immobile, recording can give notice
to prospective purchasers not just of the physical dimensions of land but
also of the legal dimensions, such as complex forms of servitudes and
future interests. 154 While prospective purchasers must search for such
information, the search is channeled into the records and the result is more
152. Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1353 (1982) [hereinafter Epstein, Servitudes]; see also Alfred F. Conard, Easement
Novelties, 30 CAL. L. REv. 125, 131-33 (1942) (arguing that the enforcement of easements should
not be objectionable on grounds of novelty as long as there is notice). Epstein has also advanced a
version of the argument in urging abolition of restrictions on the creation of future interests, such
as the Rule Against Perpetuities. Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension
in the Law of Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 705-07 (1986).
153. Epstein, Servitudes, supra note 152, at 1355.
154. Id.
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certain than was true under the common-law rules that the recording system
displaced. Moreover, Epstein recognizes the crucial point that the costs of
creating novel property rights will be capitalized into the present market
value of the property.' 55 If A creates undesirable restrictions or interests that
will be difficult to remove, then the market value of A's property drops
today by the discounted amount that future buyers would spend to remove
these items or would demand to be paid to live with them. Thus, the costs to
future purchasers of the right are internalized to the right's creator.
Aside from requiring notice, Epstein argues, the only role of courts, just
as in contract law, is to interpret the parties' intent and to supply default
terms when evidence of intent is lacking. 56 The whole point of property
law, he argues, is to establish a sphere in which individuals' choices are
respected (and facilitated through enforcement) rather than overruled by
collective preferences.' As long as actors do not infringe upon the rights
of third parties, there is no principled basis for disrespecting choices in
servitude law any more than in property or contract law more generally.
What this critique overlooks is that the adoption of idiosyncratic
property rights has an impact not only on the originating parties and
potential successors in interest, but also on other market participants.
Idiosyncratic rights create a common-pool problem, which does impose
external costs on third parties. Making the running of a fancy depend solely
on the original parties' intent and on notice-even recorded notice-to
subsequent parties acquiring property assumes that notice is the most cost-
effective method to minimize third-party information costs. But notice of
idiosyncratic property rights is costly to process, and, although land
registers furnish notice at far lower cost than would a doctrine of
constructive notice, even they can require lengthy and error-prone
searches.'58
A comparison with the costs of processing contracts highlights the
processing problem. Even the terms of a bilateral contract are not costless
to process. This is one reason why parties may leave clauses in a contract
simple: A simple clause requires less inspection for hidden traps (or
investments by the writer of the clauses in precommitting not to write in
155. Id. at 1360.
156. Id. at 1357.
157. Id. at 1358.
158. The nineteenth-century English commentators cited supra note 148 were aware of this
point. That processing costs can be higher or lower depending on how notice is presented emerges
also from the few studies on the relative costs of recording versus Torrens systems. See Joseph T.
Janczyk, An Economic Analysis of the Land Title Systems for Transferring Real Property, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 213 (1977); see also Joseph T. Janczyk, Land Title Systems, Scale of Operations,
and Operating and Conversion Costs, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 569 (1979); cf. Baird & Jackson, supra
note 117, at 308 & n.25 (noting that filing comes closer to conclusively establishing title under the
Torrens system than under other systems).
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traps).'59 These processing costs are all the higher in the more impersonal
context of land registers, and especially where transactors do not deal with
all the market participants. The very existence of idiosyncratic, hard-to-
process property rights makes information about property rights in general
harder to process. Third parties incur heavier measurement costs in
processing "notice" when the universe of property rights includes
idiosyncratic servitudes or other "fancies" than when these are prohibited.
Moreover, these costs are true externalities of any given transaction. The
costs to third parties who do not deal even indirectly with the creator of the
unusual servitude are not capitalized into the price of the creator's property,
and hence the creator cannot be expected to take these costs into account. 6°
In particular, the higher measurement costs for parties considering other
parcels are not reflected in a lower price for the parcel of the creator of such
rights.
Of course, if parties had complete freedom to customize property
rights, they would undoubtedly find it advantageous to conform somewhat
to market-generated coordination points. Nevertheless, because not all costs
of nonstandard rights would be internalized to them, we would expect to
find some individuals exercising their freedom in a way that would lead to a
suboptimal level of standardization.' 6 '
2. Standardization and Network Effects
A second possible reason why mandatory standardization may be
unnecessary is that standardization will occur spontaneously. The argument
might draw upon the growing literature on "network effects" or "network
externalities." Although somewhat difficult to define, network effects arise
when a consumer's value of a good depends on the number of other users;
the interdependence of consumer valuations leads to a network that is literal
(as in the case of the telephone system) or metaphorical (as in the case of
language). 6 ' Consumers benefit from the larger network made possible by
the participation of others or, equivalently, suffer a cost from others'
159. Eric Rasmusen, A Model of Negotiation, Not Bargaining 1-2, 8-21 (May 1, 1998)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal).
160. This of course includes parties who are not prospective purchasers but who may incur
losses due to a violation of the terms of the servitude.
161. In contexts in which marketability is a primary concern for transactors, we would expect
the desire to conform to standards to be at its greatest. Infra note 167 and accompanying text.
162. Furthermore, the decision whether to consume a good may have a positive or negative
network effect: It is positive if the choice to consume increases the value of that type of good to
other consumers (for example, by the ability to communicate or interact at low cost), and it is
negative if it reduces the value to others (for example, through overcrowding). E.g., Joseph Farrell
& Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70, 70-71
(1985); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility,
75 Am. ECON. REv. 424,426-27 (1985).
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nonparticipation.'63 To the extent that this effect is not mediated through the
market, it is an externality to a consumer deciding whether to participate in
the network.' 6 Network theory has been applied to issues arguably
analogous to the numerus clausus, such as the choice of contract terms,
particularly choice of business form, 6' although it is unclear whether such
effects are important.
6 6
The conventional approach to network externalities focuses on the
learning and network benefits of using forms that others have used and will
be using. Particularly where transactors are trying to enhance the
marketability of the property they create, there will be a strong desire to
conform to emerging standards.' 67 Thus, it may be argued, there is no need
for the government to impose limits on the available menu of property
forms; those packaging property would select standardized forms anyway,
because of the benefits of participating in a network. Government
163. Where there are network effects, the increasing returns to scale stem from demand-side
factors-consumers derive more value from a larger network-rather than from the familiar
increasing returns that stem from decreases in average costs of production (on the supply side)
over a stated period of time. STAN J. LIEBOWrrz & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS,
& MICROSOFT: COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY 90-104 (1999).
164. Terminology varies greatly by author. Liebowitz and Margolis argue for distinguishing
"network effects" from "network externalities" on the basis of whether suboptimal conditions
result: Network effects obtain in markets in which there are increasing returns to scale, and
network externalities exist only where increasing returns lead to suboptimality. S.J. Liebowitz &
Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring
1994, at 133, 135. For a discussion of the difficulties with defining externality in terms of a cost
not mediated by the price mechanism, see PAPANDREOU, supra note 121, at 49-54. The question
relevant to the design of legal institutions is whether the cost that might be termed an externality is
remediable by legal rules or not, according to one's chosen criteria for justifying legal
intervention.
165. E.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting:
Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347 (1996); Marcel
Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The
Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997); Michael Klausner, Corporations,
Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REv. 757 (1995).
166. For skepticism on this score, see, for example, Clayton P. Gillette, Harmony and Stasis
in Trade Usages for International Sales, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 707, 721-40 (1999); Clayton P.
Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REv. 813, 814-15, 822-43 (1998), which
argues that adjudication and legislation may be less susceptible to lock-in effects than are informal
norms; Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86
CAL. L. REv. 479, 562-86 (1998); and Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Fable of the
B.A.'s: Network Externalities and the Choice of Business Form (May 4, 1999) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal). Indeed, the notion of network externality runs the
danger of losing its usefulness through overbreadth and controversy over some of the canonical
examples. See, e.g., S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1990); Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 164, at 135-44.
167. E.g., ALLEN & GALE, supra note 127, at 309-14 (discussing the benefits to a firm of
offering standard forms of securities); Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 15, at 468-69; Claire A.
Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061, 1090-94 (1996)
(demonstrating how some firms benefit by reducing information costs associated with the firm
through securitization); see also, e.g., Henry T. Greely, Contracts as Commodities: The Influence
of Secondary Purchasers on the Form of Contracts, 42 VAND. L. REv. 133, 134 (1989)
(discussing the benefits of retaining standard contract forms).
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intervention to assure standardization of forms at best is redundant, and at
worst interferes with the evolution of the optimal number and type of
forms.
This argument misses the point about the nature of the problem that the
numerus clausus is designed to overcome. Government-imposed
standardization here is not designed to assure that large numbers of owners
participate in a network and, hence, provide external benefits for other
participants. Rather, standardization is imposed to control a negative
externality created by the prospect that a few persons will deviate from
popular forms. Thus, the numerus clausus is aimed at what might be called
a special kind of network confusion effect based on problems of processing
information, rather than on the size of the network of participants.
One can have a powerful network effect pushing nearly all participants
toward standard forms and still suffer from a network confusion effect that
raises the information-processing costs to all the participants in the
network. The one out of one hundred who adopts a nonstandard form for
property rights can increase the costs of processing the rights of ninety-nine
others. It is not just that the ninety-nine do not benefit from one more
addition to their "network" of standardized property rights. Rather, it is
that the ninety-nine are worse off because of the possibility of the one-
hundredth idiosyncratic right than they would be if that right could not be
created at all. This is not a matter of increasing the value of rights with
more users, but of preventing confusion to users who already exist.
We readily concede that property owners for whom marketability is
critical at the margin will standardize without government intervention.
Where actors are very interested in liquidity, economists predict a high (if
not excessive) degree of standardization. 168 It is this sort of situation on
which recent commentators have focused their attention and which fits most
comfortably within the conventional view of networks. Thus, a public
corporation designing securities to be traded on the market will respond to
the network benefits of standardization and will opt for standards without
being forced to do so. In such cases, the numerus clausus, to the extent it
plays a role, serves to identify coordination points and to start a
convention. 69
168. For example, securities' prices will be discounted to reflect the cost of acquiring
additional information if the security includes uncertain features. See, e.g., ALLEN & GALE, supra
note 127, at 123, 311-13 (discussing and citing literature). For a skeptical treatment of arguments
that network effects lead to an inefficient lock-in to standards, see supra note 166.
169. Thus, in corporate law, there seems to be a role for government standardization to
provide forms, just as the government prescribes which side of the road to drive on. But once the
coordination point attains salience through government fiat, almost everyone is happy to abide by
the regularity. See, e.g., DAvtD K. LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 78-79 (1969)
(defining "convention"); H. Peyton Young, The Economics of Convention, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Spring 1996, at 105, 105-06 (same). This role in establishing coordination points is consistent
with what Black terms triviality in corporate law. Black, supra note 134, at 544 (discussing
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In other circumstances, however, there is an implicit recognition that
the private benefits of doing the conventional thing do not always control
individual decisionmaking. For example, there will be situations involving
families and small enterprises in which idiosyncrasies in property rights
may be valued more than the fraction of common-pool increase in
information costs. For a given owner, the desire to accomplish a certain
goal (for example, keeping property within a close-knit group) can
outweigh concerns for future marketability. It is in these sorts of
circumstances that the numerus clausus does play a role.
The distinction we have drawn between ordinary network externalities
and network confusion effects carries over into other networks besides
property rights. Consider weights, measures, and money. A company that
begins using kilograms as a unit of measurement may lose the advantage of
network effects in the U.S. market, where most participants adopt English
units of measurement. But a company that begins using a nonstandard
weight called a "pound," but actually equal to 1.2 pounds, will produce far
more measurement costs for third parties; adoption of the purely
idiosyncratic unit of measurement will generate confusion. Money works
similarly, and it is noteworthy that defacing currency is sometimes a crime
while destroying it altogether is not:170 Defacing currency causes
measurement costs to rise, but destroying it does not.
The analogy to language, discussed above in Section III.B, also sheds
some light on the question of when standardization needs to be provided
centrally. Because of standard network effects, government intervention is
not required to give language a high degree of standardization: People want
to make themselves understood.' 7' Relatedly, language in most everyday
contexts is treated as a flexible (as opposed to a fixed) standard: Newly
coined words can be freely tolerated in order to express new meanings. 72 In
this respect, the numerus clausus is closer to a fixed standard like weights
and measures, where individual innovation is too costly to tolerate. Even in
market-mimicking rules). In the numerus clausus, we argue, there is a greater need to police the
standard.
170. This is the case in England and Wales. Bernard Rudden, Things as Things and Things as
Wealth, in PROPERTY PROBLEMS: FROM GENES TO PENSION FUNDS 146, 155 n.14 (J.W. Harris
ed., 1997). Similarly, it is illegal to deface currency in the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 333 (1994)
(" Whoever mutilates, cuts, defaces, disfigures, or perforates, or unites or cements together or does
any other thing to any bank bill, draft, note, or other evidence of debt ... with intent to render
such bank bill, draft, note or other evidence of debt unfit to be reissued, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.")
171. The well-known efforts of the French government to standardize the French language
are aimed less at ensuring mutual comprehension than at serving other political goals.
172. LIEBOwIrZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 163, at 87-89; see also Lawrence Lessig,
The Limits in Open Code: Regulatory Standards and the Future of the Net, 14 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 759 (1999) (distinguishing "coordinating" and "regulating" standards and noting that the
former can be imposed top-down or emerge bottom-up, but the latter usually are imposed top-
down).
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the case of language, however, there are certain contexts in which
governments do intervene to eliminate potential costs that could arise if one
or more participants did not participate in a common language. Thus, the
law mandates one standard language or use of a shared language in certain
contexts where impediments to communication can be especially costly, as
in airplane cockpits or aboard oil tankers. 17 3 These are circumstances in
which use of an idiosyncratic language by a single participant can
cause significant confusion in communication, with the costs of
miscommunication being potentially very high.
3. Privately Supplied Standardization
A third objection to government standardization is that the problem of
third-party measurement costs can be handled by private entities. The
provision of standards may seem like a public good, but this does not mean
that it must be supplied by the government. If private parties can
appropriate the benefit of the standards, they can be supplied privately. For
example, brand names or warranties might be used to vouch for the legal
dimensions of property rights, or private certification systems might arise to
assure parties that property rights conform to certain standards. 74
173. For a discussion of this issue in airline safety and an argument that ambiguity still leads
to disaster, see STEVEN CUSHING, FATAL WORDS: COMMUNICATION CLASHES AND AIRcRAFT
CRASHES 1-48, 89-110 (1994). On oil tankers, see 33 U.S.C. § 1228(a)(7) (1994), which states,
"No vessel ... shall operate in the navigable waters of the United States .... if such
vessel ... while underway, does not have at least one licensed deck officer on the navigation
bridge who is capable of clearly understanding English."; and compare United States v. Locke,
120 S. Ct. 1135, 1138 (2000), which holds that a state statute imposing an English-language
proficiency requirement on an entire tanker crew was preempted by the more limited federal
statute.
174. On standard-setting organizations in general, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied
Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 303-04 (1985). On the much-discussed role of standard-
setting organizations in electronic commerce, see, for example, Mark A. Lemley, Standardizing
Government Standard-Setting Policy for Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 745,
752-53 (1999), which discusses the role of standard-setting organizations on e-commerce in the
presence of members' intellectual property rights in standards; Jane Kaufman Winn, Clash of the
Titans: Regulating the Competition Between Established and Emerging Electronic Payment
Systems, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 675, 707 (1999), which enumerates standards-setting
organizations in the Internet commerce area; and Internet Eng'g Task Force, Overview of the
IETF, at http://www.ietf.org/overview.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2000). Standard-setting
organizations have traditionally been regarded with suspicion in antitrust law, where the adoption
of a standard violates Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act if a court finds it to have been
adopted to disadvantage a competitor. See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head,
Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988); Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S.
556, 571-72 (1982); see also Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S.
656 (1961) (leaving open the possible illegality of a standard-setting organization's refusal to
grant a seal of approval to a plaintiff's apparently safe and efficient burner).
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In many contexts, particularly where purchasers are concerned with
liquidity, we do see private standards emerge. 75 But there are theoretical
and empirical reasons to doubt that private ordering will do better than legal
constraints in standardizing the basic building blocks of property rights.'76
First, outside of contexts such as the design of securities in which liquidity
is paramount, the benefits from standardizing the building blocks of
property are likely to be small for any given owner and very diffuse.
Second, a system of private provision of standardization in property would
probably require heavy legal intervention to make it feasible.'77 Someone
would need to protect the value of the marks attached to property and police
infringement, leading to a regime like trademark law. Third, for many types
of property, the association of a mark with the property would probably not
be worth the cost: Consider that, other than real estate and automobiles, few
items of property can be registered today.' Thus, the hypothetical regime
would have none of the features-high concentrated value of assets, a
close-knit group, and a convenient method of marking-that have made
private provision of marks feasible.'7 9 Fourth, identifying to which private
system a right belongs would entail processing costs of its own.
The question would be whether private provision of standardization
would lead to enough benefits in terms of flexibility to be worth the cost of
175. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
176. See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 10 (1988) ("When the
physical facilities [of markets] are scattered and owned by a vast number of people with very
different interests, as is the case with retailing and wholesaling, the establishment and
administration of a private legal system would be very difficult. Those operating in these markets
have to depend, therefore, on the legal system of the State." (footnote omitted)).
177. Take the example of lighthouses, the classic public good. Though they have been
provided by private entities as well as by the government, see R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in
Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357 (1974), all known examples of private lighthouses have
involved at a minimum government enforcement of monopoly charters and fixing of rates, as well
as government enforcement of property and contract rights. See David E. Van Zandt, The Lessons
of the Lighthouse: "Government" or "Private" Provision of Goods, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 56
(1993).
178. Baird & Jackson, supra note 117, at 303-04 (tioting that "[fliling systems are
not... equally suited to all kinds of property," and that filing systems are better than possessory
systems when the property is not transferred often, when it is valuable, when shared ownership is
important, when physical use is key, or when the right is abstract and unembodied; immobility
and permanence are also conducive to filing).
179. Cf. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTrLE
DISPUTES 177-82 (1991) (documenting deviations between the law on the books and informal
norms enforced by neighbors in close-knit communities); Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The
Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 173 (1975)
(suggesting that the branding of livestock was initially introduced informally and was only later
recognized by legislation). In one well-studied example, mining camps in the Gold Rush, it
appears that private provision of property rights was feasible but left so much to be desired that
government aid was eventually sought. GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS
37-47 (1989) (documenting how the insecurity of privately provided property rights among early
Nevada miners led miners to seek the involvement of government in securing rights); JOHN R.
UMBECK, A THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS WITH APPLICATION TO THE CALIFORNIA GOLD RUSH
36, 85, 91-94, 99-103, 119, 126-27 (1981).
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the remaining confusion and the legal intervention needed to support it.18°
If, as we argue, the frustration costs from a fairly severe degree of
standardization through the numerus clausus are not that large,18' there is
little reason to think that private standards will be more cost-effective than
those supplied by the government. Moreover, if one set of basic building
blocks will do for most purposes, government provision of such a system is
likely to be characterized by significant economies of scale and scope.' 2
Setting up the system of property rights involves proportionately large fixed
costs compared to the marginal administrative cost of extending the rights'
application to more individuals, making jurisdiction-wide application
attractive. The state as the enforcer of property rights also probably enjoys
an advantage in delineating the basic forms of property rights: From the
point of view of the supplier, enforcing and defining basic forms of
property rights are likely to be complementary activities.
Finally, indirect empirical evidence points to the superiority of the
numerus clausus as a standardization device. Throughout history and across
numerous legal systems, the provision of standards for the basic building
blocks of the property system has been largely a government affair. The
fact that the numerus clausus is so widespread and enduring, is so pervasive
within each system, and is otherwise quite puzzling from a contractarian
point of view, suggests that it has inherent advantages for solving the
standardization problem that are not easily replicated by private ordering.
B. The Antifragmentation Objection
It has become common to regard property law as serving a function of
policing against excessive fragmentation. I8 3 This view has recently been
180. In terms of Figures 2 and 3, the number of forms (p) probably correlates with how likely
private provision of forms will be. Because they provide the largest marginal benefit at the lowest
marginal cost, simple rights with wide application will be chosen first (to the left in the figures)
and then more complex, less-widely used forms (toward the right in the figures). With the
simplest and most-widely used forms, the innovation and flexibility of private provision is less
likely to provide a large (or any) advantage over government supply of forms.
181. See supra Section II.B, in which we discuss the features of the property system and of
natural language that allow the achievement of complexity with simple forms.
182. Cf. Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis,
97 YALE L.J. 353, 389 (1988) (mentioning economies of scale that give administrative agencies
an advantage over courts and juries in devising good safety regulations).
183. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 559-60 (5th ed. 1998)
(stating that a rule forbidding restraints on alienation "reduces transaction costs, because restraints
on alienation, like rights of first refusal, create in effect divided ownership, thereby increasing the
number of parties whose agreement must be obtained before property can be transferred"); see,
e.g., Heller, supra note 12; Clifford G. Holdemess, A Legal Foundation for Exchange, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 321 (1985); Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in
NOMOS XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3, 15 (1982); Reichman, supra note 62, at
1233; Rudden, supra note 3, at 259; Stake, supra note 118, at 718-20; Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom
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elaborated by Michael Heller, who has coined the term "anticommons" to
describe the potential problem.18 The basic point is that if ownership of
resources becomes excessively fragmented, it will become difficult or
impossible to reach the unanimous consent among all stakeholders
necessary to put the property to productive uses. We have already noted
that Holmes, in Johnson v. Whiton, appeared to view the numerus clausus
as a doctrine designed to prevent undue restraints on alienation-a theory
that implicitly rests on concern about fragmentation. 85 Heller has also
recently cited the numerus clausus as an example of a property principle
that works to minimize fragmentation, thus making the antifragmentation
argument explicit.
86
Viewed as an antifragmentation regime, however, the numerus clausus
has a very curious quality; namely, it prohibits some kinds of fragmentation
but is highly tolerant of others. Parties are allowed even in the area of
personal property to fragment their interests: With respect to a watch, one
can have an unlimited number of co-owners with present possessory
interests (whether or not exercised).8 7 Thus, when it comes to division of
the watch among co-owners, the law does not prevent an anticommons but
rather leaves it up to parties to choose the degree of fragmentation they
wish, and to bear the costs of any mistakes they might make. Even more
fragmentation is allowed in real property. Indeed, from an
antifragmentation or anticommons point of view, the size of parcels or the
number of co-owners generate the most pressing problems, and yet the law
does not directly limit this type of fragmentation. Instead, it places a limit
on the number of types of interests rather than on the number of interest
holders.
Not only does the numerus clausus tolerate much fragmentation, the
principle's operation does not necessarily lead to less fragmentation. For
example, the law construes a "lease for life" to be either a life estate or a
tenancy at will.' But neither outcome reduces the number of holders.
Many applications of the numerus clausus do not result in fewer
rightholders, making the doctrine difficult to view as an antifragmentation
device.
from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70 IOWA L. REV. 615,
619-20, 624-34 (1985).
184. Heller, supra note 12; Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in
the Transition from Marx to Markets, 11l HARv. L. REv. 621 (1998).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 96-99.
186. Heller, supra note 12, at 1176-78.
187. Supra Subsection 11.B.4 (noting that concurrent interests in personal property are
permitted).
188. Supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text. As previously noted, the invocation of the
numerus clausus in Johnson v. Whiton did not necessarily reduce fragmentation, because Royal
Whiton could have chosen a permissible form for the conveyance that would have produced a
significant number of dispersed interest holders. Supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, the problem of fragmentation is addressed much more
directly through other legal doctrines besides the numerus clausus. Even if
a public remedy for "excessive" fragmentation of property rights (caused
by, say, individuals' limited foresight) were not worse than the disease,8 9
the action for partition, adverse possession, the Rule Against Perpetuities,
recording acts, doctrines of changed conditions, the government's power of
eminent domain, and the like appear to be much more direct and cost-
effective methods of preventing excess fragmentation of property rights."9
Compared to these devices, the numerus clausus does relatively little to
limit excessive fragmentation.
Simply pointing out that a rule has the effect of limiting fragmentation
to some degree is not enough to provide a persuasive explanation for its
existence. A doctrine that aims at standardizing property rights rules out
many kinds of rights, and some of these are characterized by fragmentation,
in the sense of divided ownership. But the anticommons or anti-
fragmentarian view cannot explain why the law leaves the fragmentation
decision to parties in many cases, uses mild devices to limit interests in
others, and imposes strong standardization in yet other cases.
Our focus on the information costs incurred by other market
participants is distinct from the concern with excessive fragmentation of
property rights, and, we believe, provides a better explanation for the
persistence of standardization of property forms. Viewing the numerus
clausus as a standardization device allows us to explain why it mandates a
limited number of legal forms, which are harder to process than physical
189. Cognitive biases lead to errors that are sometimes said to be inconsistent with
rationality; controversy has centered on whether the cognitive biases claimed in behavioral
decision theory (BDT) really do violate probability theory and whether the heuristics that lead to
cognitive biases are explanatory. Compare Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the
Psychology of Prediction, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 48
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (overweighting of recent data in making judgments and
forecasts), Lee Ross & Craig A. Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On the
Origins and Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY,
supra, at 129 (optimism bias), and Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Reality of
Cognitive Illusions: A Reply to Gigerenzer's Critique, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 582 (1996) (arguing
that conditions leading to cognitive error are being identified), with Jonathan L. Cohen, Can
Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated?, 4 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 317, 317 (1981)
(disputing that BDT experiments establish that subjects commit fallacies), Gerd Gigerenzer, How
To Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond "Heuristics and Biases," 2 EUR. REV. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 83, 86-101 (1991) (arguing that phenomena attributed to cognitive bias in BDT do not
actually violate probability theory), and Gerd Gigerenzer, On Narrow Norms and Vague
Heuristics: A Reply to Kahneman and Tversky, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 592, 592-95 (1996) (arguing
that some heuristics have little explanatory power). But to be inefficient in a sense relevant to
policy, there must be an ex ante or ex post method that improves outcomes more than it incurs
costs (including the costs of officials' own cognitive biases). See LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, supra
note 163, at 49-56 (describing different degrees of path dependence and arguing that a lack of
cost-effective avoidance mechanisms will make an inefficiency illusory).
190. We leave it open which of these doctrines is better at dealing with improvidence or
excessively fragmented rights. Our only point is that these doctrines would address such problems
more directly and at less cost than would the numerus clausus principle.
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attributes, and so are more in need of standardization.' 9' A concern with
types of interests is just what we expect if we view the numerus clausus as
addressed to information costs: Proliferation of types of property rights
leads to third-party information costs and suboptimal standardization.
C. The Irrelevance Objection
A final potential objection to our theory is that although the numerus
clausus is a feature of traditional forms of property such as estates in land,
it is for practical purposes irrelevant in the modern world, given the
emergence of new forms of organizational ownership based on contract.192
Contract, the objection would run, has in effect superseded property.
Contract rights are now generally freely assignable, giving such rights the
kind of transferability traditionally associated with property. Moreover,
most resources today are controlled by legal entities organized around a
nexus of contracts, such as trusts, partnerships, and corporations. Using
contracts, contract assignments, and these organizational forms, individuals
can hold resources in any form they wish, rendering the traditional boxes of
property a quaint anachronism.
We do not dispute the importance of assignable contracts and of
organizational forms of ownership, and we readily concede that these
developments have greatly enhanced the flexibility with which resources
can be deployed.1 93 But as we see it, these developments do not supersede
the standardization associated with basic property forms, nor do they render
the numerus clausus irrelevant. Rather, modern organizational forms build
up from and are dependent on the foundation established by the numerus
clausus.
First, consider assignable contracts. Contract rights today can generally
be assigned, subject to limitations that protect the original parties. 94 And in
many transactional settings, complex assignment clauses might be an
acceptable substitute for property rights. With respect to servitudes, for
example, if a real estate developer wants to assure that all houses in a
subdivision are painted beige, one can imagine doing this either with real
covenants incorporated into the deeds (the property solution), or by
executing contracts with the original purchasers that mandate that the
contract be assigned to all subsequent purchasers (and that all assignments
contain mandatory assignment clauses, in infinite regress). But property
191. Supra note 130 and accompanying text.
192. Rudden, supra note 3, at 253-54, appears to subscribe to this objection. Supra note 147.
193. See supra notes 134-135, 161, 167-169, and accompanying text.
194. Eg., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 317-18, 324, 331, 334, 340-42
(1981); 4 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 874-91 (1951 & Supp. 1999);
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 11.4-.5 (3d ed. 1999).
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rights are in rem-they serve not only to bind successors in interest but the
whole world. One can perhaps use contracts to bind successors in interest to
paint a house beige, but it is not practical to use contracts to bind the whole
world not to commit trespasses or nuisances on the property.195 In rem
rights provide protection against in personam harms, but it is not practical
to create an in rem right by bundling together myriad in personam rights
that have been individually negotiated with every potential wrongdoer. 96
Thus, in many contexts transaction costs will prevent contracts from
serving as an effective substitute for property rights.
Moreover, contract assignment builds on the most basic standardized
unit of ownership established by property law. By and large, only one type
of assignment is permitted: The assignee steps into the shoes of the
assignor."' In effect, only "full ownership" of the right can be assigned if
the assignment is to be treated as resulting in an enforceable interest in the
assignee."' Complex estates in contract rights-such as future interests-
do not seem to exist. As between the parties themselves, little is frustrated
by limiting assignments to a fee simple-like estate; by contrast,
standardizing the contract rights themselves might lower information costs
a little but would entail high frustration costs. The parties can usually serve
their objectives by tailoring the contract itself, or entering into a new
contract. But for others processing both the original contract rights and the
higher-order rights (rights over rights, etc.), it is helpful to know that only
the terms of the agreement need to be processed and that another layer of
such complexity can be safely ignored. Thus, contract rights themselves can
be tailored just as a house can be custom-built, but the way of owning it is
highly simplified to reduce information costs to third parties.
195. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance and the Costs of Determining Property
Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1985) (predicting that "mechanical" entitlement determination
costs will be used to provide clear signals to potential trespassers about the existence of property
rights).
196. For a related philosophical discussion emphasizing the differential knowledge required
of those who are bound by in rem as opposed to in personam rights, see J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA
OF PROPERTY IN LAW 23-31 (1997).
197. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 340 (1981); 4 CORBIN, supra note
194, § 891; FARNSWORTH, supra note 194, § 11.3.
198. The common law originally did not allow assignment of contractual rights without the
consent of both of the original parties, but equity adopted the modem approach of giving effect to
present assignments as proprietary interests and contingent assignments as contractual rights. See
sources cited supra note 197; see also Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 20, § 136
(Eng.) (requiring a whole chose in action or debt in order for assignment to be absolute); Walter &
Sullivan Ltd. v. J. Murphy & Sons Ltd. [1955] 2 Q.13. 584 (Eng. C.A.) (distinguishing between
absolute assignments and assignments by way of charge only); J.G. STARKE, ASSIGNMENTS OF
CHOSES IN ACTION IN AUSTRALIA 6-7, 10-50 (1972) (discussing common-law, equitable, and
statutory approaches); Thomas W. Albrecht & Sarah J. Smith, Corporate Loan Securitization:
Selected Legal and Regulatory Issues, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 411, 433 & nn.90-93 (1998)
(summarizing the pertinent English common-law and statutory history). Indeed, in contingent
assignments, an assignment can lead to contractual rights over proprietary rights in a contractual
right.
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That contract law falls on the less-standardized end of the spectrum can
be captured in the simple model we used above. Recall that, when we
modeled the number of property forms as a tradeoff between definition
costs and savings in frustration costs, we noted that property systems start
with the simplest and most-widely used forms and add more complex and
specialized forms as the number of allowed forms increases. Now consider
contractual forms. Here too we can arrange the forms along a spectrum
from most to least-widely used, but here, limiting the forms is likely to lead
to greater marginal frustration costs than in the case of property forms.'99
This can be illustrated as in Figure 4. (We assume for expositional
simplicity that the marginal costs of measuring property rights, M , equals
the marginal costs of measuring contract rights, M; this assumption is
unlikely to change the analysis because, if anything, M is likely to be
lower.)
FIGURE 4. OPTIMAL NUMBER OF FORMS
$MP= Me
TP
0 p* c* Q
Number of Forms
MP = marginal cost of measuring property rights
MC = marginal cost of measuring contract rights
FP = marginal benefit of property forms in reducing frustration of objectives
FC = marginal benefit of contract forms in reducing frustration of objectives
199. Our claim is that a hypothetical numerus clausus-like limited set of ways of contracting
(making enforceable agreements) would be unlikely to function like the building blocks of
property in being easy to combine and so accomplish a wide range of objectives. That is,
standardizing the dimensions along which contracts can vary would have an effect like
standardizing the dimensions of property-such as physical dimensions and legal conditions-
that are currently not standardized. See supra note 46.
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Because the addition of allowable contract forms saves more in
frustration costs than does the addition of more property forms, the FC curve
lies above the F curve, with the result that the optimal number of allowed
contract forms is greater than the optimal number of property forms. That
is, contract should be (and is) less standardized than is property law.
Organizational forms like trusts are also dependent on the building
blocks of the common law. Legal title to trust property is typically held in
fee simple, while the equitable interests of the beneficiaries are described in
terms of the common-law estates in land.2" This permits resources to be
managed for the benefit of one or more beneficiaries with far lower third-
party information costs than would otherwise be the case. The corpus of the
trust can be bought and sold, invested and reinvested, leased and
mortgaged, in the sound discretion of the trustee as if the property were an
undivided fee simple. The complexities of dividing the fruits of these
efforts among different generations and classes need not trouble the third
parties who deal with the trustee in the management of the trust corpus.
Dividing the fruits is a concern only of the settlor, the trustee, and the
beneficiaries. And to the extent that courts, creditors, and others must
measure the different beneficial interests, the fact that they are described in
the vocabulary of common-law estates in land reduces the information costs
associated with this exercise.
We also suspect, although the point takes us beyond the scope of this
Article, that a close look at various contractual and contract-based solutions
to the control of resources would reveal that contract law takes on a more
standardized, that is, more numerus clausus-like quality, the more third
parties enter into the picture. Consider the problem of the faithless bailee
who transfers property to a third-party purchaser for value. The Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) adopts a standardized rule in this situation,
allowing those who purchase entrusted goods in the ordinary course of
business to obtain good title if they lack knowledge of the bailor's superior
claim of title.2" ' Analogous points can be made about security interests.
Security interests are created by contract, but they bind third parties without
notice only if strict filing or recording requirements are met.202 And a
similar story can be told about organizational forms of ownership, like
trusts. As between the grantor, the trustee, and the beneficiaries, all rights
200. PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO THE LAW OF TRUSTS 2-3 (1975).
201. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) to (2) (1998). The general problem is considered in Richard A.
Epstein, Inducement of Breach of Contract as a Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 16 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 10-15 (1987); and Saul Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-
Faith Purchaser, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 59-60 (1987).
202. U.C.C. § 9-307 (1997).
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and duties could be replicated by contract."3 But as Henry Hansmann and
Ugo Mattei have pointed out, trust law performs a unique function, which
cannot be replicated by contract, in reorganizing the "rights and
responsibilities between the three principal parties and third parties, such as
creditors, with whom the principals deal." " The fact that the trust draws
upon the building blocks of common-law property also serves to lower the
costs to strangers of avoiding violations of the rights involved. 5
That contractual institutions turn to standardized terms when third
parties enter the picture suggests that the story of optimal standardization
we outlined in Part III operates not only where traditional property rights
are involved, but also with respect to institutions grounded in contract.
Thus, even in a hypothetical world in which property rights had been
rendered irrelevant by contract rights, the resulting contract-based regime
would contain features that mirror, at least to a significant degree, the
optimal standardization that the numerus clausus promotes with respect to
property.
V. THE NUMER US CLA USUS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE
The numerus clausus also has important implications for the division of
authority between courts and legislatures with respect to changes in the
structure of property rights. By limiting courts to enforcing the status quo in
terms of recognized property interests, the numerus clausus makes the
courts an inhospitable forum for modifying existing forms of property or
creating new ones. Consequently, parties who wish to secure changes in the
pattern of available property rights must look elsewhere-most
prominently, to the legislature. In this part, we argue that the institutional-
choice dimension of the numerus clausus is closely related to the basic
functional explanation for standardization of property rights set forth in Part
III: For a variety of reasons, legislated changes in property forms produce
information to third parties at less cost than judicially mandated changes.
Standing alone, this consideration does not establish that legislated rule
change is superior to judicial rule change. But it helps explain why the
numerus clausus-understood in this context to mean a significant degree
203. See Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 65, at 650 (discussing the default nature
of trust law in which "[tlhe rules of trust law apply only when the trust instrument does not supply
contrary terms" (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 164(a) (1959))).
204. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 15, at 472.
205. The standardization in each of the examples in this paragraph reduces the costs of notice
to third parties about the identity and the assets of the party with whom the third party is dealing.
This is different from the standardization of property forms required by the numerus clausus. Our
point is that the underlying information-cost economics driving each type of standardization is
similar.
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of judicial conservatism regarding innovation in the system of property
rights-is a universal feature of modem legal systems.
A. The Numerus Clausus and the Source of Legal Change
The strength of judicial adherence to the numerus clausus helps
determine which institution in society will effect changes in the structure of
property rights. The numerus clausus requires courts to respect the status
quo with respect to the menu of available property rights. Thus, the stronger
the judicial fidelity to the numerus clausus, the greater the necessity of
turning to other sources to secure modifications in property rights. In
theory, one option is to turn to private ordering. For reasons previously
recited, however, this option is unlikely to be useful in most contexts. If
private institutions cannot certify the standardization of basic property
interests," 6 it is unlikely that they can be used to eliminate existing forms or
introduce new ones. The only plausible alternative to the courts as agents of
legal reform in this context is the legislature.
The institutional-choice function of the numerus clausus can be seen
most starkly in the civil-law countries, where the principle is expressly
recognized to be a central tenet of the code and is enforced quite strictly.2"7
One consequence has been that some of the forms of property that
common-law lawyers take for granted do not exist, at least in general form,
in the civil law. The most dramatic example is the trust."8 Trusts have been
viewed by civil-law courts as a novel type of property outside the list of
forms recognized by the code. Consequently, trusts are not permitted as
such. The result, not surprisingly, is that the civilians have been forced to
rely on a variety of substitutes for the trust, most of them specifically
authorized by legislation.2"
In England, where the numerus clausus is not recognized by name but
where the courts exhibit a general conservatism analogous to that which
characterizes civil-law courts,210 the "unwritten" rule of the numerus
clausus has had a similar effect. Notwithstanding Tulk v. Moxhay,"
English courts have generally declined to create new property forms. The
result, predictably, has been that nearly all changes in the forms of property
206. Supra Subsection IV.A.3.
207. Supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
208. See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 15, at 440-45; Vera Bolgr, Comment, Why No
Trusts in the Civil Law?, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 204 (1953).
209. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 15, at 442-44; Pierre Lepaulle, Civil Law Substitutes for
Trusts, 36 YALE L.J. 1126 (1927).
210. P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS 88-93, 118-27, 134-41, 411-15 (1987); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 20-37 (1996).
211. 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848); see also supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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interests have been achieved through parliamentary action. As Holdsworth
observed: "[T]he Legislature has had a larger share in shaping the land law
than it has had in shaping any other branch of private law." 12 For example,
there is no judicially crafted action for misappropriation of information or
judicially developed right of publicity in U.K. law.213
Although the U.S. courts are far more adventuresome than either civil-
law courts or English courts, the de facto recognition of the numerus
clausus has also had a significant impact in channeling reform of property
rights to legislatures in this country. A number of examples are canvassed
in Part II. The abolition of the fee tail, dower and curtesy, the tenancy by
the entirety, and the tenancy in partnership have been accomplished in this
country by legislation, not by courts. And the creation of new interests such
as condominiums and time-shares has also been accomplished through
legislative action rather than judicial rulings. The fact that it is possible to
cite counterexamples in the U.S. context, such as the development of the
action for misappropriation of information and the right of publicity, simply
attests to the reality that the numerus clausus is a weaker doctrine in U.S.
courts, both in terms of express judicial recognition and in terms of judicial
behavior. Because the doctrine is weaker, predictably it acts more weakly
as an institutional choice mechanism in the United States than in other
countries where the doctrine is stronger.
B. The Consequences of Making Legislatures the Agents of Change
Traditional law-and-economics scholars may regard the institutional-
choice dimension of the numerus clausus as unfortunate. One of the tenets
of early law-and-economics literature was that common-law rules are more
likely to be efficient than are legislated rules.214 A central reason for this
assumption is that legislatures were regarded as being dominated by interest
groups with narrow distributional objectives, whereas common-law courts
were regarded as being immune from this type of distortion.2 Scholars
who continue to share these assumptions may regard as pernicious a
doctrine that freezes further development of property forms by courts and
212. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 148, at 325.
213. JON HOLYOAK & PAUL TORREMANS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 339-72, 381-411
(1995) (describing common-law doctrines recognized by English courts as supplementing
statutory intellectual property rights, not mentioning either misappropriation of information or the
right of publicity).
214. For citation to the relevant authorities and critical discussion, see DONALD A.
WrrTMAN, THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE: WHY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS ARE
EFFICIENT 116 (1995); Frank B. Cross, The Judiciary and Public Choice, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 355,
358-60 (1999); and Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv.
1697 (1996).
215. Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?,
101 YALEL.J. 31 (1991).
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allocates all legal change to the legislature. The numerus clausus from this
perspective would appear to consign questions about the design of the
property-rights system to the institution least likely to be motivated by
concerns with economic efficiency.
Yet if we put aside for the moment concerns about the possible
distortions of the legislative process associated with interest-group activity,
there are a number of features of legislative decisionmaking that make it
relatively more attractive than common-law decisionmaking as a basis for
modifying or creating categories of property rights.216 These features can be
summarized under the headings of clarity, universality, comprehensiveness,
stability, prospectivity, and implicit compensation.2 17 Significantly, each of
these features also bears on the explanation for the numerus clausus we
develop in Part HI-that it is designed to reduce the costs to third parties of
identifying the legal dimensions of property rights. Because of these
features of legislated change, it is possible that the advantages of the
numerus clausus as a rule of institutional choice may offset or even
outweigh the detriments traditionally" associated with legislative
decisionmaking.
1. Clarity
Legislated rule changes are more apt to be identified as such by the
community than are common-law rule changes. This is largely a function of
the form in which new rules appear. Legislated rules are set forth in a
canonical text which is easy to identify and usually terse. Common-law
rules, by contrast, often evolve incrementally through a series of decisions
over time. Moreover, they must be teased out of court opinions, which often
contain numerous qualifications, alternative holdings, dicta, concurring and
dissenting opinions, and so forth.218 Thus, informational intermediaries,
such as lawyers, realtors, lenders, title insurers, and trade associations, are
apt to grasp and disseminate information about a rule change more quickly
and confidently when the change comes about through legislation.
216. For a different view of the relative merits of judicial and legislative modifications of
property forms, see Anthony Scott, Property Rights and Property Wrongs, 16 CAN. J. ECON. 555
(1983). Scott notes the standardized nature of property rights in the course of discussing the
relative merits of litigation and legislation as vehicles for the evolution of property rights. He
reaches no firm conclusions about which institution is to be preferred, although he identifies a
number of variables that are relevant in making the comparison, Id.
217. Cf NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994) (presenting a theory of comparative institutional choice
centered on bias and expertise).
218. 3 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 50, 52-53, 649 (London, John Murray
2d ed. 1863); cf David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development
of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REv. 921, 941 (1965) (noting that when rules have
developed through adjudication, "even experienced practitioners may be hard put to state the rule
accurately").
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This feature of legislated rule change has, of course, a direct bearing on
the function of providing information to other market participants about the
dimensions of property rights. To the extent that legislated rules are more
visible than decisional rules, they will come to the attention of other market
participants more quickly and at lower cost than will decisional rules. Thus,
the institutional-choice dimension of the numerus clausus reinforces the
basic function of the principle: to reduce information costs to other market
participants.
2. Universality
Legislated rules are almost by definition universal in their application
throughout the jurisdiction. A change wrought by the legislature therefore
has an unambiguous domain. A new rule legislated by the Congress applies
throughout the United States; a new rule adopted by a state legislature
applies throughout the state. Judge-made rules, in contrast, often have an
ambiguous domain. Decisions by intermediate courts of appeal are binding
in only one district in a given political jurisdiction, and may or may not be
followed by courts in other districts. In addition, decisional rules may be
limited by their terms to certain categories of parties or certain factual
situations, with clarification of the scope of the rule left to be resolved by
future decisions. Thus, the implementation of a new rule by judicial
decision is likely to occur in a piecemeal fashion.
The lack of universality associated with common-law rules also
increases the costs to other market participants of ascertaining the rule and
comprehending the meaning of the rule for their circumstances. This is
particularly true in the case of entities that do business in different
jurisdictions or in different locations within jurisdictions. Presumably, this
is a main reason why intellectual property rights in the United States are
typically governed by federal rather than state law:2"9 Intellectual property
rights are distributed in many different states, making a uniform federal rule
easier to comprehend and enforce. This feature of legislated rules dovetails
with the basic purpose of the numerus clausus.
3. Comprehensiveness
Any creation of a new form of property raises a number of questions:
What is the range of interests encompassed by the form? Is there a time
limit on rights that come within the terms of the form? Who is eligible to
hold one of the interests covered by the form? What is the remedy for
violation of a right protected by the form? When does the change in the
219. See supra note 70.
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form take effect? Similarly, any abolition of a form of property raises
multiple questions: When does the abolition take effect? Are existing
holders to be grandfathered in or given other types of transitional relief?
What, if anything, will be used in replacement of the deleted form? Courts
are at a great disadvantage in addressing these multiple issues
comprehensively.220 Courts are limited to deciding specific issues presented
by adverse parties in the discrete cases that come before them. It might take
years or even decades to flesh out all the dimensions of a particular
modification or creation of a form of property through common-law
adjudication. In contrast, legislatures can and do typically address all these
issues comprehensively in a single piece of legislation.
The greater comprehensiveness of legislated rules is also relevant to the
information costs associated with rules and rule change. It is cheaper to
gather the needed information about all the dimensions of a rule if it is
assembled in a single place and at a single time than if it is scattered over
multiple authorities that date from different points in time.
4. Stability
Legislative adoption of property forms and legislated changes in
property forms are also more likely to be stable than are common-law rules.
The principle reason for this is that "legislative production [is] an
extremely expensive form of production. 22' It is almost certainly more
expensive in the typical case to procure a legislated change in rules than it
is to finance litigation designed to achieve a modification in legal rules.22 If
the legislature is the only forum for procuring changes in rules, the very
expense of securing such changes tightly rations the amount of reform.
Fewer reforms translates into greater stability in the dimensions of property
rights.
A second reason why legislated rules are likely to be more stable relates
again to the fact that judicial rules typically emerge piecemeal over time.
The composition of the judiciary is likely to change from one decision to
the next, especially if the court operates through panels of judges who are a
subset of the full court and are selected at random. Thus, the policy views
of the judges may shift between the first decision indicating that a rule
change is appropriate to subsequent decisions filling out the details. The
220. This was essentially Justice Brandeis's argument for allowing legislatures to develop
new forms of intellectual property rights. Int'l News Scrv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 263
(1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
221. Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 257, 267 (1974).
222. Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public Choice Theory Justify Judicial Activism After All?,
21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 219, 227 (1997).
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result. may be that the rule ends up looking different than observers may
have anticipated at first.
It is easy to see how the stability of property reforms also relates to the
theme of reducing information costs to other market participants. A rule
that has been around a long time and is relatively unchanging is more likely
to be understood because actors and the informational intermediaries who
advise them are more apt to have encountered the rule in the past and to
have made some previous investment in comprehending the rule.
5. Prospectivity
Another advantage of legislated changes in property forms-one that in
this case is less directly relevant to information costs-is that legislated
changes nearly always operate prospectively. 23 Legislative abolition of an
existing form or creation of a new one applies only going forward. Hence
legislated changes can be tailored so as to minimize the disruptive effect to
established reliance interests. Judicial changes in rules, by contrast, apply
retroactively to the parties in the case and to all others who have interests
implicated by the rule not reduced to a final judgment. 4 This is likely to be
highly disruptive to existing stakeholders. For example, if the legislature
abolishes dower rights, it can do so only with respect to future widows, or
only with respect to parties who have not yet married. A judicial abolition
would presumably affect widows currently relying on life income from
dower estates.225
The greater prospectivity of legislated changes in property rights is
relevant primarily to the level of "demoralization costs" associated with
legal change. 26 But it is not entirely irrelevant to our story about
information costs. If legal change can occur in a way that imposes high
223. See generally DANIEL E. TROY, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION (1998) (discussing
traditional objections to legislative retroactivity and the presumption in favor of prospective
operation of statutes); Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach,
110 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1063-66 (1997) (discussing judicial hostility to retroactive legislation).
224. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 513 U.S. 106 (1995); Harper v. Va. Dep't of
Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993).
225. Abolition of dower and curtesy by the legislature did in fact give rise to constitutional
challenges, with mixed results. Compare Randall v. Kreiger, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 137, 148 (1874)
(upholding the prospective abolition of the dower rights of a married woman on the ground that it
was a "mere expectancy or possibility" during the husband's life), with Class v. Strack, 96 A. 405
(N.J. Ch. 1915) (holding that a legislature was not free to abolish the dower rights of a married
woman whose husband was still living).
226. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967) (defining
demoralization costs as the losses that flow to losers and their sympathizers from the realization
that no compensation will be offered for deliberate government action that reduces the value of
property). See generally William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and
Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of "Just Compensation" Law, 17 J. LEGAL
STUD. 269 (1988) (evaluating the meaning and significance of demoralization costs).
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demoralization costs on those who hold established forms of property, then
other market participants may want to expend resources not only
identifying the existing dimensions of property rights, but also the
possibilities for future changes in those dimensions. In this fashion, a legal
regime with a higher incidence of retroactive changes in property forms-
and hence a higher incidence of demoralization costs-also is a regime that
imposes higher information-gathering costs on other market participants.
6. Implicit Compensation
Finally, legislated change in property forms has the advantage that the
legislature can devise various means for affording implicit compensation to
those adversely affected by the change.27 Courts are at a much greater
disadvantage in this regard, since courts will often not have the losers
before them and in any event are endowed with a limited set of options in
devising remedies. A classic illustration of the ability of legislatures to
afford implicit compensation is provided by the abolition of dower and
curtesy rights. Dower was a widow's right to a life estate in one-third of the
real property held by her husband, curtesy the widower's right to a life
estate in all real property held by his wife.228 Typically, when these rights
were eliminated, the legislature simultaneously adopted a forced spousal
share statute, which generally afforded the surviving spouse of either
gender the right to take in fee simple their share of the deceased spouse's
estate. 29 Thus, the forced spousal share statutes left prospective widows
and widowers better off than they were with dower and curtesy rights. If
courts were to abolish dower and curtesy rights, they would be at a much
greater disadvantage in devising a remedy analogous to the forced spousal
share statutes to provide implicit compensation for the legal change.
The greater capacity of legislatures to provide implicit compensation,
like the ability of legislatures to make legal change prospective, is relevant
primarily to the demoralization costs associated with legal change. The
ability to provide compensation allows the legislature further to minimize
demoralization costs that come from change in a way that courts cannot.
Again, however, insofar as legislatures are in a better position to reduce
227. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 582-
92 (1986) (discussing a variety of legislative compensation mechanisms, including phase-ins and
grandfathering). On the concept of implied compensation, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 195-215 (1985), which discusses
"implicit in-kind compensation" as a defense to an otherwise valid takings claim.
228. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
229. June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic
Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TuL. L. REV. 953, 970 (1991); see also LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 375-76 (1973); MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND
THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 141-84 (1986).
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demoralization costs, they are also in a position indirectly to reduce the
need for other market participants to invest resources in acquiring
information about the likelihood of future change in the menu of property
rights.
C. Legislated Rule Changes: The Final Balance
Even if we are correct that legislatures enjoy some inherent advantages
over courts in changing property rights in ways that lower the information
costs to other market participants, it is necessary to weigh these advantages
against the disadvantages of legislative rulemaking. These include the costs
of legislative inertia,230 especially in the face of problems that have low
visibility and highly dispersed costs and benefits. They also include the
dangers emphasized in the literature on public choice, such as interest group
domination, cycling among independent options, path dependency, and the
like."' The balance of merits and demerits between common-law courts and
legislatures obviously entails a complex judgment as to which no definite
answer can be offered. We would, however, offer several observations that
suggest that the demerits of the legislative process emphasized by
supporters of common-law courts may not loom as large in the context of
reforming property regimes as elsewhere.
First, the demerit of legislative inertia is in many respects just the flip
side of the merit of stability inherent in limiting change to legislative action.
Stability and change represent well-known tradeoffs in any legal system,
and a system that scores high on stability is likely for that very reason to be
slow to change. Thus, it comes as no surprise that property-law scholars
frequently complain about legislative inattention to needed reforms, such as
simplifying the system of future interests or streamlining the requirements
for establishing covenants or servitudes running with the land.232 Overall,
however, the legislative record is not that bad. Forms of ownership that
seriously interfere with the free circulation of property or otherwise outlive
their usefulness, such as the fee tail, dower and curtesy, and the tenancy in
partnership, have been abolished in nearly all states.233 And where a
significant demand for a new form of property has emerged, as with the
condominium and the time-share, legislation establishing these forms has
230. Cf GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1-7 (1991)
(discussing the general problems of legislative inertia).
231. Cf. KOMESAR, supra note 217, at 138-42 (emphasizing the need to compare the superior
expertise of legislatures against the greater risk of bias in decisionmaking). See generally DANIEL
A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991)
(providing an overview of public choice theory); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11 (1989)
(same).
232. See, e.g., French, supra note 62; Waggoner, supra note 16.
233. See supra notes 35, 50-53 and accompanying text.
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often spread very rapidly. 2' The legislative record is far from perfect. But
the areas of inertia may be more the product of a lack of consensus about
the proper path reform should take than of any inherent inability of
legislatures to respond to demands for changes in property systems.
Second, the creation of new forms of property may offer fewer
inducements to interest-group rent-seeking than is the case in other areas,
such as the revision of tax codes or the expenditure of public monies.
Adding a new type of property to the existing options changes the
opportunities for the creation of private wealth, but often does not in and of
itself create or distribute wealth. For example, if the legislature enacts a law
that makes it possible to build and sell condominiums, this does not mean
that any condominiums will actually get built and sold. Condominiums will
be built and sold only if private capital is diverted to these purposes, and
that capital typically will not be supplied by the legislature. Adding to the
corpus of property forms is thus an unlikely strategy for any group eager to
engage in redistribution of wealth. It is likely to appeal only to those groups
who are prepared to invest significant resources in productive activities and
who seek legislative change in order to maximize the return they are likely
to receive on that investment. In other words, a desire to add to the menu of
property rights is likely to be motivated by a desire to expand the size of the
pie, rather than to cut the slices in different ways.
Third, abolishing or modifying existing forms of property as a means of
redistributing wealth is sharply constrained by constitutional protections of
property rights. Suppose, for example, that a majority coalition in a state
legislature wants to abolish long-term leases of single-family residential
housing in order to provide more opportunities for fee simple ownership of
single-family homes.235 It is clear that any attempt to do this without
compensating the owners of the reversions under the long-term leases
would be uncoristitutional. If compensation must be paid, this constrains
attempts to use the legislature for such objectives. If the source of the
compensation is to come from the beneficiaries of the transfer, then such
attempts are constrained even further.236 In effect, the compensation
requirement substantially neutralizes any distributional gains from the
abolition of particular forms of property. Abolition is thus likely to be
234. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
235. Cf Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (involving a constitutional
challenge to a statute permitting the state to condemn a landlord's reversion under a long-term
residential lease and sell it to the lessee).
236. This appears to be the practice in many instances where the power of eminent domain is
delegated to permit A-to-B type transfers. See, e.g., id. at 234 (reporting that under a state statute
condemning a landlord's reversion and transferring it to the lessee, "funds to satisfy the
condemnation awards have been supplied entirely by lessees"); see also Thomas W. Merrill,
The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 61, 85-88 (1986) (discussing the secondary
rent-seeking that can come about from A-to-B transfers made possible by condemnation of
property).
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pursued only in cases where the social gains from the abolition exceed the
losses to the incumbent owners.
Finally, to the extent that distributional forces continue to play a role in
efforts to create new forms of property, it is not clear that these forces will
operate with more virulence in legislative than in judicial forums. Consider,
for example, the efforts in the United States over the last twenty-five years
to gain recognition for a right of publicity. The moving force behind these
efforts has been celebrities and their agents, the Elvis Presley Estate,
headquartered in Memphis, Tennessee, being a notable example. 37 These
entities have fought for the exclusive right to license the image of the
celebrity on coffee mugs and T-shirts, in television commercials, and so
forth. It is interesting to note that the courts of Tennessee have been among
those judicially recognizing such a right.238 One can readily portray the
process by which the Tennessee courts have reached this result as one in
which compact and well-organized private interests (Nashville recording
artists and the Presley Estate) have prevailed upon the local judiciary to
sanction a diversion of wealth from consumers in other states to actors
located in Tennessee. Whether the Tennessee legislature, not to mention the
U.S. Congress, would be as willing to recognize a property right in these
circumstances is open to question. 39
In sum, the comparison of legislatures and courts as sources of legal
innovation must be sensitive to context. Even if legislatures come out ahead
in terms of generating rules with lower information costs to regulated
parties, there is always the possibility that legislatures will be susceptible to
interest-group capture or other imperfections. With respect to changes in
property rights, however, there are reasons to believe that these sorts of
legislative failures are less pronounced than may be the case in other
contexts. This gives us further confidence in saying that the numerus
clausus operates as a rule of institutional choice to further the basic
information cost-lowering objectives we have identified.
VI. CONCLUSION
Virtually all postfeudal legal systems draw an important and pervasive
distinction between contract rights and property rights: Contract rights are
freely customizable, but property rights are restricted to a closed list of
237. See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and
Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 136-37 (1993) (noting that the "right of publicity
redistributes wealth upwards").
238. MCCARTHY, supra note 77, § 6.12[A], at 6-84.10 (summarizing the "mass of
complicated lawsuits" over whether Elvis Presley's right of publicity survived his death).
239. The Tennessee legislature adopted a more limited statutory right of publicity in 1984,
but it is unclear whether this applies to personalities who died before the act was passed (Presley
allegedly died in 1977). See id. § 6.12[B], at 6-84.12.
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standardized forms. In civil-law countries, the numerus clausus defines a
fixed universe of property rights, and the principle is rigorously enforced.
In common-law countries, the principle has no name and has not been
widely analyzed or appreciated. Nevertheless, the principle exists as part of
the "furniture" of the common law, even in the United States, where the
courts are most accustomed to tinkering with established legal doctrines.
We have argued that the numerus clausus makes sense from an
economic perspective. By permitting a significant number of different
forms of property but forbidding courts to recognize new ones, the numerus
clausus strikes a balance between the proliferation of property forms, on the
one hand, and excessive rigidity on the other. Proliferation is a problem
because third parties must ascertain the legal dimensions of property rights
in order to avoid violating the rights of others and to assess whether to
acquire the rights of others. Permitting free customization of new forms of
property would impose significant external costs on third parties in the form
of higher measurement costs. On the other hand, insisting on a "one size
fits all" system of property rights would frustrate those legitimate
objectives that can be achieved only by using different property rights that
fall short of full ownership. Optimal standardization is the solution, and the
numerus clausus moves the legal system closer to the optimum, although
we do not claim it generates a perfect mix of forms.
By insisting that courts respect the status quo in terms of the menu of
property rights, the numerus clausus also channels legal change in property
rights to the legislature. This institutional-choice dimension, we have
argued, reinforces the information-cost minimization features of the
doctrine, because legislated changes communicate information about the
legal dimensions of property more effectively than judicially mandated
changes.
The understanding that property rights by their very nature require a
significant degree of standardization has a host of potentially valuable
applications in assessing particular issues regarding property. These include
proposals to expand the list of available intellectual property rights,24°
proposals to use digital technology in conjunction with notice to substitute
for standardization, 24' and proposals suggesting that all landlord-tenant
issues be resolved in accordance with contract law precepts.242 It also sheds
important light on traditional disputes about the appropriate domain of
freedom of contract, as well as on more contemporary debates about the
240. See supra text accompanying notes 71-79 (discussing judicial recognition of intellectual
property rights under the misappropriation of information and right of publicity doctrines).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 148-151 (discussing the predicted relaxation of the
numerus clausus as cheaper forms of notice develop).
242. See Glendon, supra note 18 (noting that the reform movement in landlord-tenant law has
argued that leases should be construed as contracts).
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significance of network effects.43 and concern with fragmentation or an
"anticommons" in assessing the development of the law.'" Similarly, our
contention that standardization is advanced by forcing legal change to occur
through legislation has important implications for fledgling efforts to devise
criteria for comparative institutional analysis of courts and legislatures.245
Drawing out these implications must await another day. But we hope we
have said enough to suggest that the numerus clausus is relevant to more
than the driest and dustiest aspect of property-the system of estates in
land. It is key to understanding one of the law's most important and
dynamic institutions.
243. See supra Subsection IV.A.2 (contrasting network externalities and network confusion
effects).
244. See supra Section IV.B (criticizing antifragmentation as an explanation for the numerus
clausus).
245. See KOMESAR, supra note 217; Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and Political
Faith, 22 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 959 (1997) (reviewing KOMESAR, supra note 217) (applauding
Komesar's call for comparative institutional analysis but noting that the techniques for such an
analysis exist in a very primitive state).
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